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PRIVACY AS A COLLECTIVE NORM 
John Shaeffer and Charlie Nelson Keever* 
As the economic value of aggregating personal data has grown, so too 
have concerns over the economic power “owning” such data gives to those 
who collect it.  Existing legal regimes governing data privacy have struggled 
to strike a balance between protecting personal privacy and preserving the 
economic efficiencies that can be gained by permitting the collection and 
exploitation of personal data.  This Article proposes a collective re-concep-
tualization of one subset of personal data: information about what we do, 
say, and like.  This data has little value in isolation—it only becomes valua-
ble when combined with the information about what others do, say, and like.  
When so combined, this “big data” should be viewed, not as personal prop-
erty, but as a collective norm.  Those who collect this data deserve compen-
sation in exchange for the economic efficiencies that its collection provides; 
but complete and unlimited ownership of that data—the result of the existing 
“private property” framework—is too rich.  The Article explains how we 
arrived at the existing legal regime governing data privacy, evaluates exist-
ing structures to explain why they do not and cannot work, and argues that a 
reconceptualization of privacy makes sense economically, culturally, and 
morally.  This Article concludes by suggesting a regulatory structure that 
might better serve all interested parties when privacy is considered as a col-
lective norm. 
  
                                                          
*John Shaeffer is a partner at the firm Fox Rothschild.  The views he expresses herein are his own.  
Charlie Nelson Keever is a Staff Attorney at the University of San Francisco School of Law’s 
Racial Justice Clinic.  She is a proud alumna of Loyola Law School of Los Angeles where she 
served as editor-in-chief of the Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review.   
SCHAEFFER_MACROS_V3_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 5/16/2021  11:29 PM 
254 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:3 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States built its privacy protection scheme on the notion that 
privacy is property.  Privacy is thus subject to an individual’s own decision-
making authority.  As personal property, when an individual transacts to re-
ceive something in exchange for information about what they do, say, or like, 
what is transferred becomes the property of its acquirer.  The acquirer, as the 
property’s new owner, is thereafter free to exploit whatever economic ad-
vantage it can derive therefrom and exclude its use by others.  Treating the 
information that entities like Google, Facebook, or Amazon acquire in ex-
change for our use of their services—information reflecting what we do, say, 
and like—as their property to exploit has created an insurmountable barrier 
to competition against them.1  A barrier never anticipated, and consequently 
not accounted for, by our existing competition and privacy laws.2 
It is now beyond question that data concerning what we collectively 
do, say, and like has cultural significance and economic value.  What remains 
difficult is determining precisely what is private and what is public in various 
contexts.  The existing privacy regime effectively cedes to private, for-profit 
corporations the norms surrounding the balance of the economic and social 
benefits of the broad collection of what we do, say, and like against the det-
riments of this practice.  Not only is this system ineffectual for its purpose, 
it is also anti-egalitarian, placing the burdens on those less privileged and 
allowing the privileged to reap more of the benefits.3 
This Article proposes a shift in our mindset.  What we do, say, and like 
is our collective contribution to the society in which we live.  It is something 
distinct from what we internally think, feel, and believe, as well as that which 
fits within more traditional notions of privacy like our physical spaces, phys-
ical possessions, or sensitive information like our bank account number or 
medical information.   
Since societies began, its members have made social contributions to 
their communities by doing, saying, and liking—expressing publicly what 
they privately thought, felt, and believed.  We in the United States like 
                                                          
1. Brian Fung, ‘Near-perfect market intelligence’: Why a House Report Says Big Tech Mo-
nopolies are Uniquely Powerful, CNN (Oct. 10, 2020, 8:51 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/10
/10/tech/apple-amazon-facebook-amazon-monopoly-data/index.html [https://perma.cc/A7RY-
FQZC]. 
2. See, e.g., Ali M. Al-Khouri, Data Ownership: Who Owns ‘My Data’?, 2 INT’L J. MGMT. 
& INFO. TECH. 1, 4 (2012). 
3. See id. at 4–5. 
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hamburgers, listen to Taylor Swift, and elected Donald Trump as president.  
For better or worse, all of these things we do, say, and like become who we 
are.  Collectively, they identify us as a society and form the basis of how we 
conceive of ourselves, how other societies see us today, and how historians 
will view us in the future. 
Accepting that what we do, say, and like is both economically and cul-
turally valuable, those who develop the tools to gather our collective contri-
butions—phones, applications, search engines—should be rewarded with 
some measure of control and compensation.  But should that reward be ulti-
mate ownership?  Should entities like Google, Facebook, or Amazon be the 
arbiters for the contextual demarcation of various categories of “private” data 
and its uses?  Recognizing that such “ownership” comes with tremendous 
responsibility (much of which manifests in contentious litigation or adverse 
press), private entities now ask for rational regulation.4  Unfortunately, even 
they have been unable to articulate what could be a rational approach.  This 
Article suggests that by re-conceptualizing a subset of privacy—what we do, 
say, and like—as a public norm rather than individual property, a path to 
rational regulation can become clear. 
What would a regulatory scheme look like if we re-characterized what 
we say, do and like as a collective norm rather than as an individual’s prop-
erty?  While those who salvage this data obviously deserve compensation, 
nothing suggests such compensation should be exclusive control.  Instead, 
not only should collective norms govern the scope of any compensation, but 
collective norms should be the stewards of this collective asset, demarcating 
what is public from what is private, and determining the uses of that which 
is deemed public.  This determination would be similar to that made by reg-
ulatory entities like the Federal Communications Commission.  Common 
sense suggests that a public agency accountable to the people is better posi-
tioned to identify the contextual norm for the demarcation of social versus 
private data.   
To support this premise, this Article first defines the precise types of 
privacy, data, and information that it is concerned with, including so-called 
“Big Data.”  Parts III and IV discuss the legal and economic history of 
                                                          
4. The corporations who have most benefited from access to digital data in the form of what 
consumers do, say, and like no longer want the burden of authority over the data they purportedly 
now own.  They have called for some yet-to-be-defined rational regulation, while rejecting the 
existing schemes, which they view as undermining the economic and social value of being able to 
know what we say, do, and like.  Mike Isaac, Mark Zuckerberg’s Call to Regulate Facebook, Ex-
plained, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/30/technology/mark-
zuckerberg-facebook-regulation-explained.html [https://perma.cc/3LBX-PVY7].  
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protecting a demarcation between “private” and “public” in the United 
States, including how initial efforts to protect privacy in the digital age and 
various protection schemes were influenced by historic notions of privacy in 
particular societies.  Part V traces the proliferation of digital data collection 
and the economic value of what we do, say, and like.  Part VI discusses the 
many pitfalls of an individualist approach to privacy regulation.  Parts VII 
and VIII propose an alternative formulation of privacy, including character-
izing certain personal information as a public good or as a common.  Finally, 
Part IX suggests the broad strokes of a regulatory scheme that might better 
serve all interested parties when privacy is viewed as a collective norm. 
With this foundation, we can begin to formulate and propose a regula-
tory scheme that can maximize the social, cultural, and economic value of 
what we do, say, and like that is consistent with prevailing norms.  By re-
conceptualizing what we do, say, and like as a public norm to which we all 
contribute, we can build a better mechanism for establishing a contextual 
public/private demarcation that maximizes the social and economic value of 
our contribution while affirming the notion that there are things we simply 
do not want shared publicly. 
II. DEFINING TERMS AND SCOPE: PRIVACY, DATA, AND 
INFORMATION 
Parameters around three terms will drive this analysis: privacy, data, 
and information.  Privacy will be discussed first, with data and information 
to follow.  This section then concludes by considering the value of and myths 
surrounding large and dynamic collections of information known as “Big 
Data.” 
A. The Privacy We Are Concerned with Here 
“Privacy remains operationally a ‘fuzzy concept’: there is no broad 
consensus on what exactly privacy is, and consequently on what a right to 
privacy should protect.”5  The German philosopher Jurgen Habermas’s 
model for modern society is helpful.  It demarcates our “lifeworld” as being 
“made up of the private sphere (family, private households, intimacy) and 
the public sphere (communicative networks that enable private persons to 
take part in culture and the formation of public opinion).”6  This idea builds 
                                                          
5. Lanah Kammourieh et al., Group Privacy in the Age of Big Data, in GROUP PRIVACY: 
NEW CHALLENGES OF DATA TECHNOLOGIES 37, 44 (Linnet Taylor et. al. eds., 2017). 
6. Christian Fuchs, Towards An Alternative Concept of Privacy, 9 J. INFO., COMM., & 
ETHICS SOCIETY 220, 221 (2011).  “In the words of Vita Activa, ‘a life spent entirely in public, in 
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on Kant’s explanation of his Enlightenment philosophy, which affords the 
individual a free space for thought, but expects that such thought will be 
contributed to society for its betterment.7   
The U.S. has historically emphasized protecting the individual’s free 
space, defining privacy as a negative right: the right to exclude.8  The Euro-
pean formulation, the right to dignity, is a positive right, focusing on what 
the individual chooses to present or contribute to society, i.e., how they 
choose to take part in the culture and formation of public opinion.9  These 
distinct formulations address different privacy problems of equal importance 
on both sides of the Atlantic.  On one side are data security experts respon-
sible for privacy-enhancing technologies.  They focus on data processing and 
use.  They are particularly sensitive to securing data from unknown third 
parties, an approach commonly referred to as “institutional privacy.”10  On 
the other side are those concerned with harm experienced when “technolog-
ically mediated communications disrupt social boundaries,” referred to as 
social privacy.11  Stated more simply, the focus is on when technology cap-
tures what we do, say, or like in both our private sphere and our social sphere.  
The focus of this Article is on social privacy. 
                                                          
the presence of others, becomes, as we would say, shallow.’”  Ugo Pagallo, The Group, the Private, 
and the Individual: A New Level of Data Protection?, in GROUP PRIVACY: NEW CHALLENGES OF 
DATA TECHNOLOGIES 159, 164 (Linnet Taylor et al. eds., 2017). 
7. Towards An Alternative Concept of Privacy, supra note 6, at 230.  “Privacy is in modern 
societies an ideal rooted in the Enlightenment.  The rise of capitalism resulted in the idea that the 
private sphere should be separated from the public sphere and not accessible for the public and that 
therefore autonomy and anonymity of the individual is needed in the private sphere.  The rise of 
the idea of privacy in modern society is connected to the rise of the central ideal of the freedom of 
private ownership.  Private ownership is the idea that humans have the right to own as much wealth 
as they want, as long as it is inherited or acquired through individual achievements.”  Id. 
8. Linnet Taylor et. al, Introduction: A New Perspective on Privacy, in GROUP PRIVACY: 
NEW CHALLENGES OF DATA TECHNOLOGIES 1, 10 (Linnet Taylor et al. eds., 2017).  “[T]he right 
to privacy is primarily conceived as a negative right, which protects a person’s right to be let alone, 
while personality rights also include a person’s right to represent themselves in a public context 
and develop their identity and personality.” 
9. Yola Georgiadou et al., Location Privacy in the Wake of the GDPR, 8 ISPRS INT’L. J. 
GEO-INFO. 157, 2 (2019) (“We distinguish between privacy as a negative right (freedom from in-
terference) and privacy as a positive right (freedom to control)”). 
10. Ralf De Wolf et al., Self-Reflection on Privacy Research in Social Networking Sites, 36 
BEHAV. & INFO. TECH. 459, 2 (2016).   
11. Id. 
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The controversies and difficulties social privacy presents arise not from 
the acknowledgement that a demarcation between private and social exists, 
but instead the characterization of what fits within each category, and at what 
point the individual should lose any privacy claim to what reaches the public 
sphere.  While Eric Schmidt, the former CEO of Google and Alphabet, no-
toriously once told an interviewer:  “If you have something that you don’t 
want anyone to know, maybe you shouldn’t be doing it in the first place,”12 
accepted norms do extend legitimate claims of privacy well into the public 
sphere.13  To be clear, our interest here is not with the protection against the 
invasion of private matter such as the thoughts or intimacies shared only 
within the closest social relationships like families or romantic partnerships, 
but instead our right to control the elements of our identity that make us so-
cial beings (generally, what we do, say, and like).  This type of privacy “may 
aptly be described not only as contextually appropriate information flow, but 
also as governance of personal information.”14 
Interest in privacy has existed now for well over 250 years.15  What has 
changed is that we can now retain activity/data that was once lost or inacces-
sible due to the inability to collect, store, and retrieve the information in an 
efficient manner in an analog world.16  While this change is fundamental, it 
is foolhardy to consider privacy anew.  We cannot expect to view this new 
paradigm free from the bias of our past.  In fact, anti-skepticism is the ra-
tional explanation for why both the United States and Europe cling to notions 
of privacy as an individual right, adequately addressed by informed consent, 
despite overwhelming evidence that this approach is unworkable.17  
                                                          
12. Haydar Jasem Mohammad, Google or Privacy, the Inevitable Trade-Off 12 (Sept. 2019) 
(unpublished Master’s thesis, Arctic University of Norway) (on file with Arctic University of Nor-
way) (quoting CNBC, Google CEO Eric Schmidt on Privacy, YOUTUBE (Dec. 8, 2009), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=A6e7wfDHzew [https://perma.cc/FCZ9-9J9C]). 
13. Benedict Rumbold & James Wilson, Privacy Rights and Public Information, 27 J. POL. 
PHIL. 3, 5 (2019) (“Even in public, norms governing . . . the ‘appropriate flow of personal infor-
mation’ can still render certain activities violations of individuals’ right to privacy.”). 
14. Madelyn Rose Sanfilippo et. al., Governing Privacy in Knowledge Commons (forth-
coming Mar. 2021) (manuscript at 2) (on file with authors). 
15. See Towards An Alternative Concept of Privacy, supra note 6, at 230 (“Privacy is in 
modern societies an ideal rooted in the Enlightenment.”). 
16. See generally Kammourieh et al., supra note 5, at 56. 
17. ANNIKA RICHTERICH, THE BIG DATA AGENDA: DATA ETHICS AND CRITICAL DATA 
STUDIES 25 (2018) (Anti-scepticism “refers to the anti-Cartesian foundation of pragmatism:  ‘We 
have no alternative to beginning with the ‘prejudices’ that we possess when we begin doing 
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Consistent with the Coase Theorem,18 we must “start our analysis with a sit-
uation approximating that which actually exists, to examine the effects of a 
proposed policy change and to attempt to decide whether the new situation 
would be, in total, better or worse than the original one.  In this way, conclu-
sions for policy would have some relevance to the actual situation.”19  It is 
simply wrong to conclude that strengthening privacy can do no harm.20   
The analysis of social privacy is both economic and ethical.21  Deci-
sions about privacy are ethical in the pragmatic sense in that norms and val-
ues are being negotiated.22  The level of concern over privacy varies widely 
with some seeking strong privacy regardless of the cost and others who are 
far less concerned.23  Neither can be shown to be more objectively correct.  
There is no “right” answer.  Rather, it is a process of negotiation and 
                                                          
philosophy . . . The prejudices ‘are things which it does not occur to us can be questioned . . . Car-
tesian doubt ‘will be a mere self-deception, and not real doubt’”); see Christopher Hookway, Amer-
ican Pragmatism: Fallibilism and Cognitive Progress, in EPISTEMOLOGY: THE KEY THINKERS 
153, 155 (Stephen Hetherington ed., Continuum 1st ed. 2012). 
18. Coase Theorem is a legal and economic theory developed by economist Ronald Coase 
that affirms that where there are complete competitive markets with no transaction costs, an effi-
cient set of inputs and outputs to and from production-optimal distribution will be selected, regard-
less of how property rights are divided.  Thayer Watkins, Illustration of the Coase Theorem, SAN 
JOSÉ ST. U. DEP’T OF ECON., https://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/coasetheorem.htm [https://
perma.cc/BY2B-QZXA]. 
19. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 43 (1960). 
20. While “it is a typical American liberal belief that strengthening privacy can cause no 
harm[,] . . . privacy can undermine common goods (public safety, public health).  That privacy is 
not automatically a positive value has also been reflected in criticism of privacy.  Critics of the 
privacy concept argue that it promotes an individual agenda and possessive individualism that can 
harm the public/common good.”  Towards An Alternative Concept of Privacy, supra note 6, at 224. 
21. The economics of privacy will be explored more below in the discussion on data.  See 
discussion infra Part IV. 
22. Richterich, supra note 17, at 4 (“Within a pragmatist framework, something is ethical 
because values and morals are being negotiated.”).   
23. “Some wish to share more about themselves, and some less.”  Dennis D. Hirsch, Pri-
vacy, Public Goods, and the Tragedy of the Trust Commons: A Response to Professors Fairfield 
and Engel, 65 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 67, 67 (2016); Alessandro Acquisti et. al, The Economics of 
Privacy, 54 J. ECON. LITERATURE 442, 446 (2016) (“[P]rivacy sensitivities and attitudes are sub-
jective and idiosyncratic, because what constitutes sensitive information differs across individu-
als.”).   
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renegotiation.24  To paraphrase Slavoj Zizek, since we will not find the right 
approach, we must strive towards the least wrong approach.25   
What informs this analysis is how we view our human relations in our 
society.  Based on fieldwork performed in the 1950s, the social anthropolo-
gist Mary Douglas theorized four cultural poles—egalitarianism, hierarchy, 
individualism, and fatalism—with all cultures having some balance of all 
four.26  How each approaches justice helps to elucidate their meaning:  egal-
itarianism views justice as a just outcome for all; hierarchy views it as a 
rights-based process; to an individualist, it means “to each his due;” and a 
fatalist views justice as whatever power dictates.27   
As noted above, the United States takes an individualist approach to 
privacy, allowing each individual to transact their privacy like a commodity 
but requiring informed consent.  Europe’s individualist approach is more hi-
erarchical, requiring individuals to affirmatively opt into the collection of 
their data.  A privacy fatalist sees no point in regulating personal information 
because any scheme will be breached.  A privacy egalitarian, by contrast, 
considers the social: what policy is fair to all members of a society regardless 
of their technical sophistication.28  While cultures with an individualist bent 
have a transactional view of privacy, an egalitarian culture would view what 
its members do, think, and say as part of the collective culture.  A way to 
distinguish between an individualist approach and an egalitarian approach 
can be described “by the rallying cries ‘my data belong to me, and I can use 
it for whatever purpose’ vs. ‘privacy is a human right, and its protection is in 
the public interest.’”29   
                                                          
24. Richterich, supra note 17, at 25 (Anti-foundationalism “between more or less reliable 
and well-grounded knowledge: in this sense, knowledge is not seen as universal and beyond even-
tual revision, but may be subject to reconsideration in light of future discoveries or develop-
ments.”). 
25. SLAVOJ ZIZEK, ABSOLUTE RECOIL: TOWARDS A NEW FOUNDATION OF DIALECTICAL 
MATERIALISM (reprt. 2015) (2014). 
26. Georgiadou et al., supra note 9, at 10. 
27. Id. at 10–11. 
28. Id. at 10. 
29. De Wolf et al., supra note 10, at 3. 
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Privacy, in all instances, is a relative right and not an absolute right.30  
This can be seen in Europe’s codification of its right to privacy—“the right 
to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence”—
as set forth in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(“ECHR”), which expressly recognizes that privacy can be limited “in the 
interests of national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the 
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health 
or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”31  While 
like the United States’ more narrowly drawn Fourth Amendment rights, Ar-
ticle 8 of the ECHR is expressly limited to actions by the state, the jurispru-
dence surrounding both suggests a shared contemporary public norm that 
one’s right to privacy must be balanced with “security,” “economic wellbe-
ing of the country,” and “protection of health or morals.”32  One should not, 
however, view this as a duality, as in the more privacy is protected, the more 
these more social values are compromised.  Rather, each value represents 
different interests that any law or regulation should seek to optimize.33  In 
other words, more privacy does not necessarily mean less security, and vice 
versa.34  Similarly, Big Tech criticizes individualized informed consent re-
gimes and, in particular, more onerous opt-in formulations, for failing to ad-
equately consider their macro-economic harm in terms of lost efficiencies.  
While Big Tech has indicated a willingness to be regulated, in order to avoid 
the hammer these regulations impose on missteps, it has yet to find an ac-
ceptable balance within an individualized approach.35  If a balance between 
                                                          
30. Pagallo, supra note 6, at 209. 
31. Guide on Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights: Right to Respect for 
Private and Family Life, Home and Correspondence 7, 11 (2020) (Council of Eur: Eur. Ct. H.R.) 
https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/guide_art_8_eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/WAM5-WE9V]. 
32. Id. at 11. 
33. “Antidualism stresses the need to refrain from predefined, taken-for-granted dichoto-
mies.”  Richterich, supra note 17, at 25. 
34. “The tension is sometimes presented as being asymmetric: between the ethics of pri-
vacy and the politics of security.  In fact, it is ultimately ethical.  Two moral duties need to be 
reconciled proactively: fostering human rights and improving human welfare.”  Luciano Floridi, 
Group Privacy: A Defence and an Interpretation, in GROUP PRIVACY: NEW CHALLENGES OF DATA 
TECHNOLOGIES 83, 84 (Linnet Taylor et al. eds., 2017). 
35. See Isaac, supra note 4. 
SCHAEFFER_MACROS_V3_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 5/16/2021  11:29 PM 
262 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:3 
competing norms is not achievable within the informed consent structure, 
maybe it is time to consider other paradigms.   
Privacy is also contextual.36  Most people would reasonably agree that 
what they tell their doctor is meaningfully different than what they post on 
Facebook.  This difference, however, does not mean that individuals have no 
privacy interest whatsoever in what they post on Facebook.  More rationally, 
it means that what works for one will not necessarily work for the other.  
“Contextual privacy is ‘preserved when informational norms are respected 
and violated when informational norms are breached . . . . [W]hether or not 
control is appropriate depends on the context, the types of information, the 
subject, sender, and recipient.’”37  Helen Nissenbaum, who receives much of 
the credit for exploring this subject, is recognized for making four key 
claims:  “(1) privacy is appropriate flow of personal information; (2) flows 
conform with entrenched contextual informational norms; (3) contextual in-
formational (privacy) norms refer to five independent parameters (subjects, 
senders, recipients, information types, and transmission principles); and (4) 
privacy is respected when an action conforms to legitimate, social and indi-
vidual, norms.”38   
Significantly, the United States’ approach to privacy has been contex-
tual in that it developed in a sector-specific manner.  “Laws such as the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996 and 
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) of 1999 cover data uses in narrow 
contexts, such as health and financial information respectively.”39  For in-
stance, credit reporting is currently one of the most highly regulated sectors 
in the United States, tracing its lineage at the federal level to the Fair Credit 
Report Act of 1970 (FCRA).40  Such legislation precludes financial 
                                                          
36. From an economic perspective, “[t]he value of keeping some personal information pro-
tected and the value of it being known are almost entirely context-dependent and contingent on 
essentially uncertain combinations of states of the world.”  Acquisti et. al., supra note 23, at 446.  
From a social view, “the right to privacy is properly understood as a right to ‘contextual integrity’ 
and what this amounts to ‘varies from context to context.’”  Rumbold, supra note 13, at 5. 
37. Christian Fuchs, The Political Economy of Privacy on Facebook, 13 TELEVISION & 
NEW MEDIA 139, 142 (2012).   
38. Sanfilippo et. al., supra note 14 (manuscript at 20). 
39. MICHELLE DE MOOY, RETHINKING PRIVACY SELF-MANAGEMENT AND DATA 
SOVEREIGNTY IN THE AGE OF BIG DATA: CONSIDERATIONS FOR FUTURE POLICY REGIMES IN THE 
UNITED STATES AND EUROPEAN UNION 11 (2017).   
40. Acquisti et. al, supra note 23, at 471. 
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institutions from discrimination based on personal attributes such as racial, 
ethnic, or other protected characteristics.  However, “[t]echnological ad-
vancements have made [it] possible [now] for lending companies to mine 
online and offline data and make offers only to populations with credit at-
tractiveness.”41  The disparate, sector-specific approach may be a boon for 
lawyers and consultants who have mastered the myriad of overlapping state 
and federal sector-specific approaches.  As the availability of diverse data 
from diverse sources continues to expand, however, this sector-specific ap-
proach will become unmanageable in the absence of an omnibus solution 
under the auspices of a single authority well versed in privacy’s contextual 
nature. 
Finally, before considering what data/information is private, one must 
acknowledge the relational aspect to social privacy.  “When two people—
let’s call them Alice and Bob—interact, and Alice learns something about 
Bob in the process, Bob may place his faith in Alice that she will not com-
municate these details to others.  Bob’s privacy depends, in part, on Alice’s 
behavior:  here, her willingness to abstain from speaking about their interac-
tions.”42  Similarly, when Alice posts a picture of herself that captures Bob, 
she is disclosing information about Bob.  Moreover, the mere fact that Bob 
associates with Alice discloses information about Bob.  Thus, trust in some 
notion of privacy between Bob and Alice with respect to the information they 
share with each other, is undermined if they share that information across 
any sort of social network, including email, or simply in a public place.  
“[R]elational privacy recognizes that different privacy expectations attach to 
different people and institutions in our lives and suggests that law should 
take into account these different sensitivities in setting rules about such ex-
pectations (for example, by recognizing that we may have a greater interest 
in privacy against the government than we do against our neighbors).”43  As 
will be developed below, it is largely this relational aspect to privacy that 
makes the current individualist approach based on informed consent so ill-
conceived. 
                                                          
41. Nir Kshetri, Big Data’s Impact on Privacy, Security and Consumer Welfare, 38 
TELECOMMS. POL’Y 1134, 1148 (2014). 
42. Solon Barocas & Karen Levy, Privacy Dependencies, 95 WASH. L. REV. 555, 556 
(2020). 
43. Id. at 560; Karen Levy et al., Regulating Privacy in Public/Private Space: The Case of 
Nursing Home Monitoring Laws, 26 ELDER L.J. 323, 327–29 (2019). 
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B. Data and Information 
When we move away from privacy as a demarcation, the question be-
comes:  What is it precisely that we want to keep private?  Whether personal 
thoughts, credit card numbers, information about one’s body, or simply per-
sonal information that one wishes to control with respect to one’s social self, 
these are all things that can be expressed in words.  As intangibles, each is 
distinct from our norm of protecting physical property as private, which we 
view as having its own unique economic value to our society in and of itself.  
To illustrate, there is a distinction between the value of my car, which has 
value independent of its connection to me, and my bank account number, 
which is a set of numbers with no value absent its connection to me.  Unfor-
tunately, this distinction is inevitably blurred by concepts like “intellectual 
property,” which extends the protections we afford physical matter to things 
that exist in words or ideas.  For example, trade dress protection is not con-
cerned with the physical packaging itself, but with the inanimate attributes a 
configuration has in the minds of consumers.  In the same way, copyright is 
not concerned with the physical manifestation of a creative endeavor, 
whether captured in a book, a painting or a sculpture, but the inanimate ex-
pression itself.44  Put simply, if you steal a physical book or work of art, you 
have not committed copyright infringement.   
Contemporary nomenclature conceives of “data” as that which can be 
expressed in words as opposed to physical matter.45  Currently, data “refers 
to discrete, objective facts or observations about a person, event or situation 
that is unorganized, unprocessed and without specific meaning.”46  While 
                                                          
44. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 US 339, 347 (1908) (“‘The copyright is an exclusive 
right to the multiplication of the copies, for the benefit of the author or his assigns, disconnected 
from the plate, or any other physical existence. It is an incorporeal right to print and publish the 
map’” (quoting Stephens v. Cady, 14 How. 528, 530 (1852)). 
45. Curiously, “data” derives from the Latin plural of datum, meaning “that is given,” 
which seems to relate only to certain readily apparent information, such as one’s age, location, and 
race.  This definition ignores what we do, say, and like; better characterized as our “achievements,” 
which would be sublata in Latin.  While we will discuss later how best to characterize data, some 
may suggest that “what is given” about ourselves (in other words, our attributes) are distinguishing 
characteristics like what the qualities that differentiate one piece of property from another.  Such 
attributes, however, are aspects of personhood, which most societies distinguish from property in 
that one cannot sell oneself into slavery and most societies consider prostitution to be a crime.  
Richterich, supra note 17, at 4; Lauren Henry Scholz, Big Data is Not Big Oil: The Role of Analogy 
in the Law of New Technologies, 86 TENN. L. REV. 863, 880 (2020).   
46. Arjuna Dibley & Rachelle Cole, Big Value from Big Data? Recognizing Public Value 
from Public Data in the Innovation Economy, DIG. CITIZEN CONF., U. OF MELBOURNE 5 (2019). 
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data by itself has some value, its true value comes from its relation to other 
data, which is information.  For example, the number of questions a student 
answers correctly on a test is data, but that piece of data only has meaning, 
or provides information, when compared to the performance of others on the 
same test.47   
The EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) defines per-
sonal data as “any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural 
person.”48  Personal data can come in three forms: volunteered, that which 
one freely gives; observed; and inferred, that which is derived from relations 
with other data.49  Such data can be spatial—including information from 
which a location can be determined—or not.50  While securing raw data such 
as medical records and credit card numbers—the principal focus of institu-
tional privacy—is no doubt valuable, it is clearly no longer sufficient to ad-
dress all normative privacy concerns, as the passage of the GDPR demon-
strates.51 
Data, and the information derived therefrom, has always been of keen 
interest to governments, social scientists, economists, and those in the private 
sector.52  Until recently, however, personal data has been a relatively scarce 
good “and [its] compilation was subject to controlled collection and deliber-
ate analytical processes.”53  While the film The Lives of Others shows the 
great lengths the East German Stasi went to collect information on its citi-
zens,54 today only trust protects societies from becoming police states.55 
                                                          
47. Id. at 5–6. 
48. Commission Regulation 2016/679, art. 4, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 33 (EU). 
49. Georgiadou et. al., supra note 9, at 7. 
50. Id. 
51. Kammourieh et al., supra note 5, at 65. 
52. “The history of the modern state, and the history of data are deeply intertwined. Data 
was, and remains, an important tool for the state to understand the public over which it has govern-
ing power, and for exercising that power.”  Dibley & Cole, supra note 46, at 2. 
53. Richterich, supra note 17, at 4 (citing ROB KITCHIN, THE DATA REVOLUTION: BIG 
DATA, OPEN DATA, DATA INFRASTRUCTURES AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES (2014)). 
54. DAS LEBEN DER ANDEREN (Wiedemann & Berg et al. 2006). 
55. “As Richard Clark (2014), a former presidential cyber security advisor and one of the 
authors of the American government’s report reviewing the data collection and monitoring capa-
bilities at the NSA, stated, ‘we have created the potential of a police surveillance state.’”  Quirine 
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What has changed is that what was once lost—essentially all personal 
data that members of past societies did not knowingly provide—is now rel-
atively easy to collect, retain, and analyze.  There are at least five steps to 
this complete “datafication”56 of personal information: (1) digital data stored 
on networked computers; (2) consumer adoption of the internet; (3) the pro-
liferation of smart phones; (4) the adoption of networked biometric sensors; 
and (5) the “internet of things,” which includes home listening devices such 
as Amazon’s Alexa or Ring, Apple’s Home Pod, and Google’s Home and 
Nest.  “The spread of mobile computing and sensor technologies has blurred 
the distinctions between digital and physical, online and offline.  All of this 
has led to services that simultaneously generate and capture digital trails of 
personal and professional activities—activities that were previously con-
ducted in private and left little or no trace.”57   
This advance is viewed positively not only by techno adepts, “but also 
amongst scholars who see datafication as a revolutionary research oppor-
tunity to investigate human conduct.”58  “Traditionally, gathering population 
data has involved surveys conducted on the individual level with people who 
knew they were offering up personal information to the government.  The 
census[, for example,] is carefully guarded by the public authorities, and mis-
use of its data is trackable and punishable.”59  Today, vast amounts of per-
sonal data, far beyond anything conceivable prior to the internet, is gathered, 
processed, and controlled by private corporations with still immature forms 
of public oversight.60 
                                                          
Eijkman, Indiscriminate Bulk Data Interception and Group Privacy: Do Human Rights Organisa-
tions Retaliate Through Strategic Litigation?, in GROUP PRIVACY: NEW CHALLENGES OF DATA 
TECHNOLOGIES 151, 155 (Linnet Taylor et al. eds. 2017). 
56. “Datafication refers to the quantification of social interactions and their transformation 
into digital data.”  Richterich, supra note 17, at 1. 
57. Acquisti et. al., supra note 23, at 444. 
58. José van Dijck, Datafication, Dataism and Dataveillance: Big Data Between Scientific 
Paradigm and Ideology, 12  SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 197, 198 (2014). 
59. Linnet Taylor, Safety in Numbers? Group Privacy and Big Data Analytics in the De-
veloping World, in GROUP PRIVACY: NEW CHALLENGES OF DATA TECHNOLOGIES 24, 24 (Linnet 
Taylor et al. eds. 2017). 
60. “Today’s social media, search engines and the internet of things produce more data in 
only a brief period of time than were previously generated in all of human history.”  De Mooy, 
supra note 39, at 4. 
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C. The Value of Big Data and Its Limitations 
“Big Data” refers not only to the collection of this data, but also its 
processing.  Big Data has long been defined as “‘high-volume, high-velocity 
and high-variety information assets that demand cost-effective, innovative 
forms of information processing for enhanced insight and decision mak-
ing.’”61 
Big Data is less concerned with the linkage of data with an identified 
individual, in the way institutional privacy is, e.g., securing the tie of a par-
ticular individual to a particular medical or financial record.  Instead, Big 
Data is concerned with connecting traits and finding patterns.  “By combin-
ing structured and unstructured data from multiple sources, firms can un-
cover hidden connections between seemingly unrelated pieces of data.”62  
Simply put:  “users of big data may not care about Alice at all, but only about 
the fact whether Alice, whoever she is, belongs to the group that regularly 
goes to the local church, or mosque, or synagogue, uses Grindr, or has gone 
to a hospital licensed to carry out abortions, or indeed shares [some other] 
feature of your choice.”63 
Through the use of particular algorithms, commonly referred to as Ar-
tificial Intelligence (AI) or machine learning, vast amounts of data are pro-
cessed through computers to train the computers to identify patterns and 
links between data known about one person with another.  “By extracting 
subsets from individual-level information or classes of similar individuals 
based on common habits and characteristics, technology can itself discover 
or “create” groups that may have consequences for members.”64  To illus-
trate, “Future Attribute Screening Technology (FAST) is a crime-prediction 
program developed by the Department of Homeland Security.”  “The pur-
pose of the program is to ‘rapidly identify suspicious behavior indicators to 
provide real-time decision support to security and law enforcement person-
nel’” by linking currently observed activity of a person or group with historic 
                                                          
61. Kshetri, supra note 41, at 1134 (quoting Definition of Big Data, GARTNER INFO. TECH. 
GLOSSARY, https://www.gartner.com/en/information-technology/glossary/big-data [https://
perma.cc/NAU5-CPTF]).   
62. Id. at 1146. 
63. Jennifer Jiyoung Suh et al., Distinguishing Group Privacy From Personal Privacy: The 
Effect of Group Inference Technologies on Privacy Perceptions and Behaviors, 2 PROC. OF THE 
ACM ON HUM.-COMPUTER INTERACTION 1, 2 (2018). 
64. Id. at 3. 
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data of other persons or groups.65  Given that the value of Big Data comes 
from its ability to identify patterns and link traits to groups, to claim that 
security and privacy are protected simply by anonymizing that data seems 
rather shallow.66   
One significant limitation of Big Data—among others—is that it is not 
neutral because not all members of a society contribute to the same extent.  
Data sets will be biased in favor of those less concerned about privacy who 
“have the necessary resources, plus the skills and an interest, to use certain 
digital devices and platforms.  Although collected in immense quantities, 
[B]ig [D]ata may still represent [only] specific populations.”67  Big Data fails 
to capture both technologically sophisticated individuals who actively avoid 
contributing data, but also those who lack the means or skills to actively par-
ticipate online.  For example, Apple released its Research Kit in 2015, which 
it touted “as an efficient, effective possibility for recruiting study participants 
and collecting data.”68  This collection, however, is limited to Apple users 
who are already known to be a distinct demographic group, so much so that 
some online retailers know that they are typically willing to pay more for a 
service.69 
The flaws of Big Data should not lead to the conclusion that we can 
ignore the economic or social harm in implementing legislation that under-
mines its value in the name of privacy.  We must acknowledge that our ex-
isting preference for notice and consent schemes in the name of privacy pro-
tection can undermine the social and economic value of this data.  To some, 
the fully informed consumer would share the views of strong privacy 
                                                          
65. Joshua A.T. Fairfield & Christopher Engel, Privacy as a Public Good, 65 DUKE L.J. 
385, 405 (2015) (quoting DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE 
FUTURE ATTRIBUTE SCREENING TECHNOLOGY (FAST) PROJECT 2 (2008), https://www.dhs.gov/ 
xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_st_fast.pdf [https://perma.cc/UE3H-3CFE]). 
66. With Big Data “the particular and the individual is no longer central . . . . Data is ana-
lysed on the basis of patterns and group profiles; the results are often used for general policies and 
applied on a large scale.  The fact that the individual is no longer central, but incidental to these 
types of processes, challenges the very foundations of most currently existing legal, ethical and 
social practices and theories.”  Taylor et. al, supra note 8, at 13–14. 
67. Richterich, supra note 17, at 46. 
68. Id. 
69. Dana Mattioli, On Orbitz, Mac Users Steered to Pricier Hotels, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 23, 
2012, 6:07 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles
/SB10001424052702304458604577488822667325882 [https://perma.cc/EP4F-CWAW]. 
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advocates and rationally decide that neither private corporations nor the gov-
ernment should know what they say, do, or like, beyond that which they ex-
plicitly direct towards those entities.  If consumers were capable of compre-
hending the notices they receive, they would opt out of most data collection, 
destroying the value of Big Data.   
Big Tech’s concern with respect to the GDPR opt-in approach to con-
sent is the belief that most consumers are relatively passive and if given the 
choice, they would prefer not to check a box regardless of its purpose.  If too 
many were to decline to participate and refuse to contribute what they say, 
like, and do to Big Data, we would then return to the analog world of the last 
century (and likely suffer an economic recession due to the loss of efficien-
cies that Big Data has delivered).70  This is surely not the case for those who 
subscribe to the belief that what Big Data has delivered is an illusion, but 
most would agree that Netflix knows better what we want to watch than the 
historic Nielsen system.71  Many may not lament the destruction of Big Tech 
companies (those that exist because of Big Data) that a competent notice and 
choice system would likely cause, but if one agrees that knowing what we 
collectively say, do, and like has a macro economic and social value, a leg-
islative scheme that “sticks it to Big Tech” becomes a societal self-inflicted 
wound.   
By the same token, if there is societal value to data collected, societies 
are logically paying too much to its collectors by ceding the data collected 
to them as the collector’s property alone.  While a compelling argument can 
be made that the insights collectors or other users gain from the data col-
lected own their insights, the data itself is society’s and not the collector’s 
property alone.  The data is a collection of our shared activity, communica-





                                                          
70. Yan Carrière-Swallow and Vikram Haksar. The Economics and Implications of Data 
An Integrated Perspective, No. 10/16 INT. MONETARY FUND 1, 29 (2019) (“[A] push to tighten 
privacy regulations may be effective at protecting consumer rights but may generate unforeseen 
harm to efficiency and competition”). 
71. Timothy Havens, Media Programming in an Era of Big Data, 1.2 MEDIA INDUSTRIES 
J. 5, 7 (2014) (“The Netflix prize was built around improving what’s known as a “collaborative 
filtering” algorithm, which uses such things as viewer ratings, history, and behavior to recommend 
content that already exists on the service.” (emphasis in original)). 
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III. THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC HISTORY OF PRIVACY IN THE UNITED 
STATES: A LEGAL REGIME FOUNDED IN INDIVIDUALISM 
The prevailing attitudes towards privacy in Western societies—and the 
legal regimes derived therefrom—have their roots in the Enlightenment.72  
This is when philosophers challenged the public to emerge from immaturity 
and to rely on one’s own understanding without the guidance of others.73  
Freedom was a prerequisite to achieving this goal, as men must be able to 
think freely, while still behaving obediently in civil society.74  Such free-
thinking men were not only “completely free” to pursue their thoughts, but 
were also “obliged to impart to the public all [their] carefully considered, 
well-intentioned thoughts.”75  This idea of personality separate and apart 
from society is a uniquely Western European one.76 
Self-determination as championed by Enlightenment thinkers is the 
foundation of both America’s Declaration of Independence and the French 
Revolution.77  The focus of both historical efforts was to protect individuals 
from the State.  Surprisingly, however, the word privacy appears nowhere in 
the U.S. Constitution.  At best, the Fourth Amendment, adopted with this 
Constitution as part of the Bill of Rights, established a threshold for state 
                                                          
72. Towards An Alternative Concept of Privacy, supra note 6, at 230. 
73. Immanuel Kant, An Answer to the Question: “What is Enlightenment?”, (Sept. 30, 
1784), https://web.cn.edu/kwheeler/documents/What_is_Enlightenment.pdf [https://perma.cc
/38T9-PMCB].  It is important to recall that these societies believed that such “enlightenment” 
would be pursued only by a privileged few since “[l]aziness and cowardice are the reasons why 
such a large proportion of men, even when nature has long emancipated them from alien guidance 
(naturaliter maiorennes), nevertheless gladly remain immature for life.”  Id. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. It contrasts sharply, for example, with “Ubuntu, the famed African egalitarian culture, 
whose core definition is ‘people are people through other people’ [which] leaves little room for 
personal privacy.”  Georgiadou et al., supra note 9, at 13.  Similarly, while China affords some 
protections for workers and consumers collectively from misuse of their data by companies, 
“[t]here are no comprehensive legal principles that protect privacy interests⁠ nor any effective defi-
nition of privacy exist in China and the general population of China have no knowledge of the 
concept of privacy.”  Mohammad, supra note 12, at 12–13 (citing Hao Wang, PROTECTING 
PRIVACY IN CHINA: A RESEARCH ON CHINA’S PRIVACY STANDARDS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF 
ESTABLISHING THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE INFORMATION PRIVACY PROTECTION 
LEGISLATION IN MODERN CHINA (2011)). 
77. Kammourieh et al., supra note 5, at 54. 
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interference with private property.  Its guarantee of an individual’s right to 
private property free from interference is a foundational notion of liberty as 
defined in the U.S. 
The connection between privacy and property was necessary for the 
nascent democracies founded in the late 18th century with capitalist econo-
mies to solidify and thrive.  John Stuart Mill would later write about the value 
of private property to a successful economy.  Specifically, “the right of each 
to his (or her) own faculties, to what he can produce by them, and to whatever 
he can get for them in a fair market: together with his right to give this to any 
other person if he chooses.”78  To Mill, privacy: 
[I]s a circle around every individual human being, which no 
government, be it that of one, of a few, or of the many, ought to 
be permitted to overstep: there is a part of the life of every person 
who has come to years of discretion, within which the 
individuality of that person ought to reign uncontrolled either by 
any other individual or by the public collectively.79 
Much of our current thought about a right to privacy beyond personal prop-
erty can be traced back to Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’s 1890 arti-
cle80 written in response to the increasing intrusiveness of technology and 
the media.  The authors recount how “[i]nstantaneous photographs and news-
paper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic 
life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good the prediction 
that ‘what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-
tops.’”81  They found protecting individuals against invasion of their per-
sonal realm a “right of the individual to be let alone,” which they labeled as 
a “‘right to privacy’—the invasion of which [amounted to] a tort.”82   
                                                          
78. JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 200 (D. Appleton and Com-
pany ed. 1885). 
79. Towards An Alternative Concept of Privacy, supra note 6, at 223. 
80. See Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 
(1890).   
81. Id. at 195.   
82. Dennis D. Hirsch, Protecting the Inner Environment: What Privacy Regulation Can 
Learn from Environmental Law, 41 GA. L. REV. 1, 11–12 (2006). 
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Justice Brandeis would later expand on this idea, which he considered 
inherent in our jurisprudence, finding a constitutional foundation to the right 
to be left alone in the Fourth Amendment.  In his view, this right not only 
prohibits physical trespass on one’s private property, but more generally, 
protected against the “unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon the 
privacy of the individual.”83  According to Brandeis, “[t]he makers of our 
Constitution . . . . conferred, as against the government, the right to be let 
alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civi-
lized men.”84   
Recently, a sharply divided Supreme Court reaffirmed Justice 
Brandeis’s expansive reading by explicitly recognizing that, while Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence was “‘tied to common-law[,]’”85 “‘property 
rights[, such rights] are not the sole measure of Fourth Amendment viola-
tions.’”86  The Court recognized that “[w]hen an individual ‘seeks to pre-
serve something as private,’ and his expectation of privacy is ‘one that soci-
ety is prepared to recognize as reasonable,’ [the] . . . official intrusion into 
that private sphere generally qualifies as a search and requires a warrant sup-
ported by probable cause.”87  While the Court reaffirmed that “a person has 
no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over 
to third parties,”88 the mere fact that the information is in the possession of a 
third party alone is not determinative.89  Finally, and relevant to our discus-
sion here, the Court reaffirmed that “[a] person does not surrender all Fourth 
Amendment protection by venturing into the public sphere.”90   
                                                          
83. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).   
84. Id.   
85. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018) (quoting United States v. 
Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012)). 
86. Id. (quoting Soldal v. Cook Cty., 506 U.S. 56, 64 (1992)). 
87. Id. (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979)).   
88. Id. at 2216 (quoting Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–44). 
89. Id. at 2217. 
90. Id. 
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Outside the realm of the Fourth Amendment, the U.S. Supreme Court 
has, since 1965, recognized a constitutional right to privacy. 91  Specifically, 
in overturning state regulation of contraception, the Court found within the 
First Amendment’s “freedom to associate” a penumbra protecting the “‘pri-
vacy in one’s associations.’”92  Curiously, despite the tremendous focus on 
privacy recently, the general public’s consensus that privacy is a shared 
norm, and the endless debate about the breadth of its protection under the 
federal Constitution, there has been little effort to codify this norm as a con-
stitutional amendment.93  By contrast, eleven states have explicitly recog-
nized a right to privacy in their constitutions, many of which were enacted 
following Griswold v. Connecticut.94   
While both the Fourth Amendment and the penumbra found within our 
right of association apply only to state actors, these articulations are evidence 
of a shared cultural norm.  Bolstered by the foundational norm of private 
property, which is the cornerstone of Western capitalist society, this juris-
prudence on privacy reflects a shared norm of privacy that reaches all facets 
of U.S. society.  Significantly, as developed, this right to privacy is a nega-
tive right, the right to be left alone.95  This contrasts with the European norm, 
rooted in the devastating experience of World War II, which focuses on pro-
tecting human dignity.96  Both legal schemes, however, take as their focus 
the individual, the individual’s property interest in their privacy, and both 
consider informed consent to be paramount.97 
                                                          
91. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965). 
92. Id. (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958)). 
93. One may surmise that this is largely due to this country’s endless abortion debate.   
94. See Privacy Protections in State Constitutions, NCSL (Oct. 6, 2020), https://
www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/privacy-protections-in-
state-constitutions.aspx [https://perma.cc/BNJ5-ZJBE]. The people of the State of California 
adopted their right to privacy in 1974, which reads, “All people are by nature free and independent 
and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, 
possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.”  
CAL. CONST. art. 1 § 1. 
95. Taylor et. al, supra note 8, at 10. 
96. Georgiadou et al., supra note 9, at 2; ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 40–41 
(Ig pub. ed. 2015) (1967). 
97. Fairfield & Engel, supra note 65, at 412. 
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A first articulation of a shared norm of privacy reaching all facets of 
the U.S. is found in the Fair Information Principles (“FIPs”), published by 
the U.S. Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Sys-
tems in 1973.98  FIP identifies legal guidelines for personal data compiled on 
computer systems.  Five principles form its foundation: 
1) [T]he existence of personal-data record-keeping systems 
should not be kept a secret; 2) people must have a way to find out 
what information about themselves is being stored and how it is 
being used; 3) people must have a way to prevent information 
about them obtained for one purpose from being used or made 
available for other purposes without their consent; 4) people must 
have a way to correct or amend records containing personally 
identifiable information; and 5) all organizations creating, 
maintaining, using or disseminating personally identifiable data 
must assure that the data is reliably being used as intended, and 
must take precautions to prevent misuse.99   
The Privacy Act of 1974 was the first body of law to meet these standards.100  
It specifically governed the collection, use, maintenance, and dissemination 
of information held by federal agencies.101  Significantly, despite dramatic 
changes in technology following its original adoption, most current U.S. and 
European regulatory schemes, including the EU General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) and California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), remain 
firmly rooted in FIPs.102  The primary reason that FIPs fail is that the princi-
ples expect “individuals to monitor organizations in order to ensure that their 
information is accurate, complete, and used only for the purposes to which 
the individual has agreed.”103   
                                                          
98. De Mooy, supra note 39, at 9 (citing U.S. Department of Health, Education and Wel-
fare, Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems, Records, computers, 
and the Rights of Citizens viii (1973)). 
99. Id. 
100. Id. at 12. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. at 12–13. 
103. Priscilla M. Regan, Reviving the Public Trustee Concept and Applying It to Infor-
mation Privacy Policy, 76 MD. L. REV. 1025, 1027 (2017).   
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In addition to the individualist property approach to privacy that must 
have seemed a logical extension of Western society’s preference for private 
property, regulatory inaction contributes to our current predicament.  Begin-
ning in 1927, the U.S. recognized the need to provide regulatory oversight 
over the public airway, which at the time was radio.  Specifically, the Federal 
Radio Commission (“FRC”) (the predecessor to the Federal Communica-
tions Commission (“FCC”)) was established to ensure that those receiving 
broadcast licenses served “the public interest, convenience or necessity.”104  
The idea was that: 
The public, with the government as its agent, would hand over—
gratis—a license to use its airwaves to operate a radio station for 
a fixed period of time.  In exchange, the lucky recipient of this 
extremely lucrative asset would operate the station as a trustee for 
the public that owned its spectrum.105   
Specifically, “the broadcasting privilege will not be a right of selfishness.  It 
will rest upon an assurance of public interest to be served.”106  Congress en-
acted the Communications Act of 1934 and replaced the FCR with the FCC, 
not only to correct deficiencies, but to broaden public powers over licensee 
conduct.”107   
By the 1980s, however, the FCC began to dismantle itself; first under 
the Carter administration with respect to radio broadcast,108 and then under 
the Reagan administration with respect to television.109  The consensus was 
that “consumer demand” was a sufficient check to ensure that broadcasters 
acted in the public’s interest.  Following this deregulation fervor, the Clinton 
administration took a hands-off approach to the infant internet.110  In fact, 
                                                          
104. STEVE WALDMAN, THE INFORMATION NEEDS OF COMMUNITIES: THE CHANGING 
MEDIA LANDSCAPE IN A BROADBAND AGE 280 (2011). 
105. Id. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. at 280–81. 
108. Id. at 283–84 
109. Regan, supra note 103, at 1025. 
110. Id. 
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rather than simply relying on consumer preference, the administration en-
acted legislation and passed regulations to shield those playing in this arena 
from liability that would otherwise cripple non-digital competitors, be they 
broadcasters or retailers.111  While the internet lacks the spectrum limitations 
of terrestrial broadcast media, and, as it developed, did not recognize national 
borders, the idea that public preference alone would serve as an adequate 
check now seems quaint and plainly naïve.   
IV. THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF PRIVACY 
The progression of economic research on the issue of privacy and its 
impact on an economy is also helpful to understand where we are today.  
Building on the idea that individuals have a property interest in information 
they consider to be private, economists in the 1970s and 1980s began con-
sidering the impact of this property interest on the broader economy.  Rich-
ard Posner, who is both a noted jurist as well as a respected economist, ar-
gued “that the protection of privacy creates inefficiencies in the marketplace, 
since it conceals potentially relevant information from other economic 
agents.  For instance, if a job seeker misrepresents her background.”112  
Based on this research, Judge Posner continues to believe that: 
[M]uch of what passes for the name of privacy is really just trying 
to conceal the disreputable parts of your conduct . . .  Privacy is 
mainly about trying to improve your social and business 
opportunities by concealing the sorts of bad activities that would 
cause other people not to want to deal with you.113   
George Stigler, sharing Judge Posner’s view, concluded that regulation in 
the market for personal data was destined to be ineffectual “because individ-
uals have an interest in publicly disclosing favorable information and hiding 
                                                          
111. Annemarie Bridy & Daphne Keller, Comment Letter on U.S. Copyright Office’s Sec-
ond Notice of Inquiry regarding Section 512, at 1 (March 31, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=
2757197 [https://perma.cc/TKQ2-PBF2]. 
112. Acquisti et. al, supra note 23, at 450. 
113. Fairfield & Engel, supra note 65, at 416 (quoting Grant Goss, Judge: Give NSA Un-
limited Access to Digital Data, PC WORLD (Dec. 4, 2014, 1:46 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/ar-
ticle/2855776/judge-give-nsa-unlimited-access-todigital-data.html [http://perma.cc/649V-
9WTR]). 
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negative traits.”114  Both Posner and Stigler took what we would consider 
today to be a very narrow view of privacy.   
Similarly, during this time before the advent of the internet and Big 
Data, economists also questioned the social value in the acquisition of per-
sonal data, finding, at best, “it results in a redistribution of wealth from ig-
norant to informed agents.”115  It was recognized, however, that certain forms 
of regulation could be socially enhancing.  For example, privacy protections 
for health information enhance non-distorted disclosures.116  So prior to the 
internet, the most favorable view of the economic value of privacy was 
mixed.   
Research into the economics of privacy resurged in the 1990s, during 
the infancy of the public internet in the matter.117  In particular, the advent 
of new low-cost technologies to collect and manipulate personal information 
would likely change the relationship between buyers and sellers.  Research 
showed that consumers may suffer an economic cost if they chose to share 
less rather than more information about themselves online.118  For this rea-
son, a rational consumer would expect to receive a net benefit from a deci-
sion to share personal information even though they would have little under-
standing or control over how that information would later be used.119  This 
conclusion spawned new markets for personal data.120  At this time, however, 
markets seemed to have difficulty valuing personal data, and an empirical 
search began to determine the value of personal data as compared with 
                                                          
114. Acquisti et. al., supra note 23, at 450 (citing George J. Stigler, An Introduction to 
Privacy in Economics and Politics, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 623, 623–44 (1980)). 
115. Id. (citing Jack Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value of Information and the Re-
ward to Incentive Activity, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 561, 649–64 (1971)). 
116. Id. at 451. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. at 452 (citing Hal R. Varian, Economic Aspects of Personal Privacy, in PRIVACY 
AND SELF-REGULATION IN THE INFORMATION AGE (Barbara S. Wellbery ed., 1997), [https://
perma.cc/47LR-8SC4]). 
119. Id. at 452. 
120. Acquisti et. al., supra note 23, at 452. 
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historical analog data.121  Simply put, it was the comparative value of an 
internet eyeball measured by a click compared with an analog eyeball de-
rived from a Nielsen rating or subscription data.  It is curious that, during 
this time, advertising and subscription-based websites that tried to recreate 
the broadcast and cable television model online failed.122 
At this time, economic researchers began to consider the question of 
who should hold the economic claim to the personal data collected.123  While 
it was recognized that only regulation could answer this question, economi-
cally, its answer would tip the balance between the amount paid for access 
against the cost of protection.124  The economic implications of changes to 
the cost of acquisition and the cost of protection remain a fruitful source of 
economic research.125   
A third wave of economic research into privacy corresponds with the 
dawning of the 21st century as the internet entered its adolescence.  Much of 
this focus is: 
[O]n issues surrounding privacy as the protection of information 
about a consumer’s preferences or type (hence a significant 
number of models examine the relationships between privacy and 
dynamic pricing), different dimensions to privacy (and different 
dimensions of informational privacy) exist, and economic trade-
                                                          
121. Matthew Crain, A Critical Political Economy of Web Advertising History, THE SAGE 
HANDBOOK OF WEB HISTORY 1, 7–11 (2019). 
122. Id.; Evans, David S., The Online Advertising Industry: Economics, Evolution, and Pri-
vacy, J. ECON. PERSP. FORTHCOMING 1, 5 (2009) (available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=
1376607). 
123. Acquisti et. al., supra note 23, at 452 (citing Eli M. Noam, Privacy and Self-Regula-
tion: Markets for Electronic Privacy, in PRIVACY AND SELF-REGULATION IN THE INFORMATION 
AGE (1997), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/report/1997/privacy-and-self-regulation-information-age 
[https://perma.cc/4F47-62QJ]). 
124. Id. 
125. See, e.g., Rodrigo Montes et al., The Value of Personal Information in Markets with 
Endogenous Privacy (Toulouse Sch. of Econ., Working Paper No. 583, 2017), https://www.tse-
fr.eu/sites/default/files/TSE/documents/doc/wp/2015/wp_tse_583.pdf [https://perma.cc/3PNY-
CR8W]. 
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offs can arise from different angles of the same privacy 
scenarios.126   
At this time, Western economies experienced dramatic shifts.  Transactions 
and activities that were once private due to the lack of cost-effective means 
to capture and compile their analog occurrence, had now moved online.127  
For the first time, economists witnessed the rise of huge corporations fi-
nanced principally based on their control over both structured and unstruc-
tured data.   
What drove revenues online was not targeted banner advertising of the 
type most akin to advertising on television and in print media, but instead 
the ability to target products, content, and price based on personal (and his-
torically private) information about actual or potential consumers.128  The 
digital economy quickly learned that online consumers did not trust what 
they considered online advertising, but appreciated what they perceived as 
the targeting of products, services, and content they wanted.129  This discov-
ery is the foundation of the monetization of personal and private data.  
Quickly, with this discovery, the economic power of online businesses 
funded by personal data surpassed that of businesses supported by traditional 
advertising (which only had the ability to target an audience of a particular 
demographic).  Simply, data captured online had economic value far beyond 
ordinary advertising, and the granularity of what was now available digitally 
could never have been conceived in our historically analog world.130  As a 
result, companies whose survival turned on outdated forms of advertising are 
now clearly in the decline.131 
                                                          
126. Acquisti et. al., supra note 23, at 454. 
127. Id. 
128. Crain, supra note 121, at 11–22.   
129. See Acquisti et. al., supra note 23, at 466 (“Goldfarb and Tucker (2011a) find that 
obtrusive targeted ads—targeted in the sense that they are matched to the content of a website, and 
obtrusive in terms of visibility—are more likely to trigger privacy concerns among users in com-
parison to obtrusive but not targeted ads, or targeted but less obtrusive ads.”  Avi Goldfarb & Cath-
erine Tucker, Online Display Advertising: Targeting and Obtrusiveness, 30 MARKETING SCI. 389, 
389–404 (2011)). 
130. De Mooy, supra note 39, at 17. 
131. Evans, supra note 122, at 10 (“[O]nline advertising [is] a more efficient matchmaking 
vehicle for advertisers and viewers than offline advertising”). 
SCHAEFFER_MACROS_V3_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 5/16/2021  11:29 PM 
280 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:3 
V. THE PROLIFERATION OF DIGITAL DATA COLLECTION AND THE 
ECONOMIC VALUE OF WHAT WE DO, SAY, AND LIKE 
Knowing what societies, or their innumerable subgroups, do, say and 
like is incredibly valuable.132  This value is both microeconomic—providing 
intelligence to the businesses that have it—and macroeconomic—promoting 
efficiencies to an economy as a whole by being able to deliver to a society 
what it wants. 
Of all possible economic examples, the historic Nielsen rating sys-
tem—the audience measurement system developed in the 1950s—is apt.  
Television historically presented something of an economic curiosity.133  Af-
ter purchasing a television set, consumption was free because the cost of 
production was borne by advertisers wanting access to its consumers.  Addi-
tionally, the industry’s product, a television show, has no objectively intrin-
sic value in the same way the performance of a BMW and a Hyundai can be 
compared.  Instead, the value of a network television show is derived solely 
from consumer taste.  While some would argue that a PBS broadcast of the 
Metropolitan Opera has more comparative cultural value, more American 
eyes will certainly be glued to the latest broadcast of The Bachelor.  This 
makes The Bachelor much more economically valuable and likely more rel-
evant to cultural norms in the U.S., whether we like it or not.  An efficient 
market, therefore, became dependent upon knowing what consumers like.  In 
the analog world of the 20th century, it was not possible to know what the 
hundreds of millions of households in the U.S. were watching at any given 
moment.134  The Nielsen system became a surrogate for this data.  It 
equipped approximately 10,000 homes throughout the country with a system 
that would record the viewing habits of a household and that data was then 
extrapolated out to the nation as a whole.135  Hundreds of millions of adver-
tising dollars were spent annually, predicated—and the fate of countless tel-
evision shows rested—on what these few households chose to watch.   
Until the 21st century, societies lacked other means to comprehensively 
collect these contributions and they were left with gross surrogate measures, 
                                                          
132. Id. 
133. Shawndra Hill, TV Audience Measurement with Big Data, 2 BIG DATA 76, 76–77 
(2014). 
134. Id. at 77. 
135. Robert Rußell et. al., Monetizing Online Content: Digital Paywall Design and Con-
figuration, BUS. INFO. SYS. ENG. 62, 253–60 (2020).  
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such as polling or sales revenues.136  This changed when computers, inter-
connected with each other, provided the means for retaining these expres-
sions in the form of digital data.  In its infancy, and through its early adoles-
cence, the World Wide Web explored numerous alternatives for 
monetization.  The first phase was the pay-for-a-portal model of America 
Online (AOL), which tried to containerize a user’s entire online experience.  
Once access became a commodity, like the cable for your television, the pri-
vate sector tried subscription models similar to newspapers or magazines.  
Consumers, however, equated being online to watching broadcast television, 
and were reluctant to pay for content when so much other content remained 
free.137  Seizing upon the broadcast television analogy, online content and 
service providers next touted the eyeballs they could deliver to advertisers.  
Advertisers were not persuaded that an eyeball on the internet would lead to 
sales in the same way they believed eyes and ears connected with sales on 
television and radio.  Innumerable ad-supported websites and internet mar-
keting companies rose and fell during this tumultuous period.   
Today, however, Big Data is touted as “‘the world’s most valuable re-
source.’”138  Google contributed to this change.  At the time it launched, 
Google was merely one of numerous search engines used to navigate the 
internet, with Yahoo being the prevailing leader.  What distinguished 
Google, however, was that it wanted to be nothing more than a search engine.  
Google offered a place for search queries, and, at most, changed the graphic 
of its name.  Google’s simplicity contrasted sharply with its competitors.  In 
order to be “sticky”—the buzzword of the time—Google’s competitors filled 
themselves with loads of other content to hopefully keep users within their 
ecosystems.139  These sites sought to monetize stickiness with untargeted 
banner ads to generate revenues.  What Google understood, or discovered 
through sheer luck, is that most users wanted to be somewhere else and were 
looking for the fastest, easiest, and least obnoxious way of getting there.  Ra-
ther than rely on the banner ads that cluttered other sites, Google sold the 
                                                          
136. Hill, supra note 129, at 77. 
137. See Victor Pickard & Alex T. Williams, Salvation or Folly? The Promises and Perils 
of Digital Paywalls, 2 DIGITAL JOURNALISM 195, 200, 207 (2014). 
138. Dibley & Cole, supra note 46, at 3. 
139. Mohamed Khalifa et. al., Online Consumer Stickiness: A Longitudinal Study, 60 
PACIS 856 (2001). 
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right to appear in relevant searches, meaning that users could purchase search 
terms (AdWord).140 
As consumers preferred Google’s model, not only did its search engine 
gain a competitive advantage, but it started to collect huge amounts of data 
about those using its service, linking searching histories to IP addresses and 
allowing the company to gain valuable information about those who used its 
service.  Advertising with Google evolved from simply purchasing key 
words to the ability for Google to offer more robust socio-economic and de-
mographic information to advertisers.  This resulted in the development of 
targeted ads, which were seen as a win-win for consumers and sellers.  The 
theory behind targeted ads was that “[t]o the extent that people can avoid 
seeing ads for things in which they have no interest, and instead see ads for 
things they might want to buy, everybody benefits.”141  “From this perspec-
tive, the online economic ecosystem is [seen as] a clear improvement over 
the earlier world of mass media, where a lot of advertising expenditure is 
wasted, precisely because it can’t be targeted.”142 
This belief in the value of targeted advertising was overwhelmingly 
adopted by the private sector, spawning an entire industry around collecting 
information about consumers’ perceived wants.143  Digital ad spending for 
2019 in the U.S. alone was $145.3 billion, increasing over 19% from 2018, 
and is triple what it was a decade ago.144  Digital advertising now accounts 
for half of all advertising dollars spent in this country, with television in sec-
ond place at 27.5%.145  Virtually every connected business, from Facebook 
to a local grocery store or gas station, now collects data about their users and 
                                                          
140. See Grow Your Business With Google Ads, GOOGLE ADS (2021), https://
ads.google.com/home/#!/. 
141. Christopher W. Savage, Managing the Ambient Trust Commons: The Economics of 
Online Consumer Information Privacy, 22 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 95, 135 (2019). 
142. Id. 
143. Fung, supra note 1. 
144. US Online Media Spend in 2019 and the Outlook for 2020, MARKETING CHARTS (Feb. 
5, 2020), https://www.marketingcharts.com/advertising-trends/spending-and-spenders-111801 
[https://perma.cc/F7GS-LCYH]; Bradley Johnson, Internet Media’s Share of U.S. Ad Spending Has 
More Than Tripled Over the Past Decade, ADAGE (Dec. 30, 2019), https://adage.com/article/year-
end-lists-2019/internet-medias-share-us-ad-spending-has-more-tripled-over-past-decade/2221701 
[https://perma.cc/L66D-7BF8]. 
145. Johnson, supra note 144. 
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most both sell and purchase such data from data aggregators.146  Where his-
torically, television and radio stations could provide you some rudimentary 
demographic information about their viewers and listeners, such as age, gen-
der, and likely socio-economic status, content providers like Spotify today 
can provide advertisers with granular data based not only on the data they 
collect from their listeners, but also from other data aggregators.147  With this 
data, Spotify can design unique and perhaps even previously unrecognized 
groups to meet a particular advertiser’s need.148   
The actual value of targeted advertising, however, is suspect.  “[V]iew-
ers click on less than 1% of ads displayed, and click-through rates even for 
ads on highly targeted services like Facebook and Twitter are in the range of 
1 to 3%.”149  While targeted visual ads on websites that make use of Big Data 
are considered to be less obnoxious by consumers than untargeted banner 
ads, at least one study suggests these ads only generate twice the revenues 
per ad as a wholly untargeted ad.150  Some cite privacy regulations permit 
consumers to opt out of data collection as a reason for the poor sell-through, 
arguing that ads are not as targeted as they otherwise could be.  They simi-
larly fear that newer opt-in schemes will further erode, if not destroy, the ad-
supported internet.151  Research suggests, however, that a more likely reason 
for poor sell-through is that “advertisers or data intermediaries—seldom pos-
sess socially optimal incentives to match consumers with products.”152  Ag-
gregators realize that providing imperfect or incomplete data maximizes 
their ultimate returns.  Despite concerns about low success rate, regardless 
                                                          
146. Kirsten Martin, Data Aggregators, Consumer Data, and Responsibility Online: Who 
is Tracking Consumers Online and Should They Stop?, 32 INFO. SOC’Y 1, 51–63 (2016). 
147. Matteo Poletti, Learning to Target Advertisements at Spotify, KTH ROYAL INS. TECH. 
1, 7 (2015). 
148. “By extracting subsets from individual-level information or classes of similar individ-
uals based on common habits and characteristics, technology can itself discover or ‘create’ groups 
that may have consequences for members.”  Suh et al., supra note 63, at 3. 
149. Savage, supra note 141, at 105. 
150. Acquisti et. al, supra note 23, at 464.  For context, Google earns about one third of its 
revenues from AdSense, its service for targeting ads on websites, with the remaining two-thirds 
coming from search AdWord.  Id. at 466. 
151. Id. at 456; Savage, supra note 141, at 104–05. 
152. Acquisti et. al., supra note 23, at 459. 
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of the reason, digital advertising remains viable because of its relative low 
cost and sheer scale.   
In addition to the ability to target offers to potential consumers through 
advertising, Big Data enables the customization of products and the tailoring 
of prices to particular consumers.153   
For instance, if the price of a movie/music is outside a consumer’s 
affordability range and if the supplier lacks the ability to price 
discriminate, the difference between the price the consumer is 
willing to pay and the marginal cost of a copy of the movie/music 
represents deadweight loss.154   
Knowing a consumer’s purchasing history or being able connect them to a 
group whose history is known, enables suppliers to manipulate price to af-
fordability to overcome deadweight losses or to increase prices in order to 
recover optimal profits.155  The economics concerns balance tradeoffs from 
protecting or sharing personal data.156   
One thing that is clear is that the balance in any sales transaction has 
shifted.  It is true that consumers have much more access to price and product 
information than they did previously, and are not as geographically con-
strained in their purchases as they once were.  Sellers, however, not only 
know a lot more about each consumer individually—even in the case of new 
consumers—they also know a lot more than they used to about how people 
decide to buy, including their cognitive limitations biases.157  This suggests 
that the actual merits of a product or service play a decreasing role in pur-
chasing decisions.158 
Recent economic research focuses on the impacts of varying privacy 
costs on effective price discrimination and the impacts of restrictions on the 
                                                          
153. Montes et al., supra note 125, at 32, 34. 
154. Kshetri, supra note 41, at 1145. 
155. Id. 
156. Acquisti et. al., supra note 23, at 443. 
157. Savage, supra note 141, at 142. 
158. Id. 
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use and availability of data.159  For example, research shows that “[a] prohi-
bition on the collection, processing or commercial use of data would pre-
sumably increase the price of products and services for the consumers, with 
uncertain results that this solution would enhance the competition from rival 
firms,” i.e., price discrimination based on a customer’s profile is likely eco-
nomically positive to the economy as a whole.160  Additionally, it has been 
shown that “[p]rice discrimination in the absence of universal transaction 
privacy leads to a welfare loss whenever the profiling of consumers is im-
perfect.”161  Stated more simply, “due to unavoidable errors in customer pro-
filing, retailers will mistakenly quote high prices to some customers” above 
which they are willing to pay and vice versa, resulting in an overall loss of 
social welfare.162  More troubling, however, is the fact that access to more 
data than a competitor can entrench monopolies, and data brokers maximize 
their economic benefit by not selling the same data to all rivals.163   
While, on balance, Big Data bring efficiencies to the purchase and sale 
of products, it is far from the whole story of the economic, social, and cul-
tural value that the collection, storage, and processing of what we say, do, 
and like has to a society.  The availability of Big Data increases the efficiency 
of production processes and provides predictive insights into market 
trends.164  In addition to enhancing economic efficiencies, the societal bene-
fits of collecting and processing large amounts of personal information are 
numerous, including advancements in public health, education, welfare, and 
security.165   
                                                          
159. See Montes et al., supra note 125. 
160. Andrea Giannaccari, The Big Data Competition Story: Theoretical Approaches and 
the First Enforcement Cases 3 (Eur. U. Inst. Dep’t of L., Working Paper No. 10, 2018). 
161. Rodney J. Garratt & Maarten R. C. van Oordt, Privacy as a Public Good: A Case for 
Electronic Cash 12 (Bank of Can., Staff Working Paper No. 24, 2019). 
162. Id. at 32. 
163. The data seller’s profits are greater when it sells the full dataset to one firm only rather 
than selling an additional imperfect dataset to the other firm competing on the same market.  Montes 
et al., supra note 125, at 30; Richterich, supra note 17, at 41. 
164. Giannaccari, supra note 160, at 4. 
165. De Mooy, supra note 39, at 24. 
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With the maturation of the digital economy, the collection, access, and 
control of Big Data resides with fewer and fewer private entities.166  This Big 
Data divide is evident from the fact that Google, which remains the world’s 
most used search engine, is now only the 25th most frequently visited web-
site, and today’s top ten websites account for 62% of all web traffic.167  Con-
sumers no longer need to search where they might want to go—they already 
know where they want to be.  Similarly, most commercial websites are now 
hosted by Amazon’s Amazon Web Services (“AWS”) and most mobile data 
passes through Apple IOS or Google Android.  These entities decide how 
data is fed into their algorithms that determine the content we subsequently 
see.168  This content is not limited to advertisements, but also information 
posts they determine fit with our interests.  These commercial websites use 
public concern over privacy to eschew efforts to develop methods for data-
sharing, suggesting that others may not be as careful stewards of our personal 
data.169  They know that: 
[C]onsumers are more likely to grant their opt-in consent to large 
networks with a broad scope, rather than to less established firms.  
Hence, if regulation focuses only on enforcing an opt-in approach, 
users may be less likely to try out services from less established 
firms and entrants, potentially creating barriers to entry.170   
This lack of data-sharing and roadblocks to nascent competitors’ 
acquisition of personal data serves to undermine competition and 
further entrench their positions.171 
                                                          
166. “The phrase ‘big data divide’ emphasizes the tensions resulting from asymmetries in 
data access.  It calls attention to the biased capacities for gaining insights into this material and 
assessing its implications.  In addition, the term ‘data monopolies’ stresses that this divide not only 
characterizes customers’ lack of agency, but the market dominance of very few internet and tech 
corporations.”  Richterich, supra note 17, at 41. 
167. Joshua Hardwick, Top 100 Most Visited Websites by Search Traffic (2021), AHREFS 
BLOG, https://ahrefs.com/blog/most-visited-websites/ [https://perma.cc/48L9-MT6J]. 
168. Richterich, supra note 17, at 1. 
169. Id. at 40. 
170. Acquisti et. al, supra note 23, at 456. 
171. “[F]irms with market power often benefit from committing to privacy policies.”  Id.   
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In addition to the economic power this data gives those who control Big 
Data, their current “ownership” over Big Data enables them to influence sci-
entific research reliant on this data.  It is not uncommon for such research to 
either be conducted by persons employed by these entities or funded in whole 
or in part by them.172  “The triple role of data collector, service provider and 
funding body is a defining feature of internet/tech corporations.  It puts these 
stakeholders in a powerful position.”173  Today, these few entities get to “de-
cide which societal actors may have access to data generated via their re-
spective platforms, and define in what ways they are made available.”174  As 
noted in a 2017 report published by the Google Transparency Project, be-
tween 2005 and 2017, 329 research papers dealing with public policy issues 
in the interest of Google were funded by the corporation.175  Similarly, 
“[o]nly Facebook has the data that can exactly reveal how fake news, hoaxes 
and misinformation spread, how much there is of it, who creates and who 
reads it, and how much influence it may have.”176 
Private entities that collect personal data as an exchange for some ser-
vice, such as providing search results or access to a social media platform, 
have no economic interest in protecting user privacy.  Instead, their interest 
rests in preserving trust.  Virtually all human interactions rest on some mod-
icum of trust as “trust is a transaction catalyst.”177  “The information econ-
omy[, whether it is providing a credit card with a transaction or interacting 
with a website,] is premised on the sharing of personal information; it is ‘me-
diated by information relationships’ to a far greater extent than prior econo-
mies.”178  We are told to be wary of “untrusted” sites, understanding that 
such sites may compromise data we wish to keep private.  While the public 
tends to have a short memory, or is simply forgiving, as evident by consum-
ers returning to Target after its big data breach, or to Facebook after its 
                                                          
172. Richterich, supra note 17, at 3. 
173. Id. at 65. 
174. Id. at 9. 
175. Id. at 62. 
176. Regan, supra note 103, at 1038 (citing Zeynep Tufekci, Opinion, Mark Zuckerberg Is 
in Denial, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/15/opinion/mark-
zuckerberg-is-in-denial.html [https://perma.cc/QY3R-54US]). 
177. Savage, supra note 141, at 121. 
178. Hirsch, supra note 23, at 83. 
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Cambridge Analytics fiasco, most believe that “if trust absorbs too many 
body blows, it can crash.”179  Simply, “online entities . . . are not competing 
to provide consumers with an optimal level of privacy; they are cooperating 
in an effort to ensure that the level of consumer trust doesn’t sink so low that 
people stop coming online.”180   
VI. WHY AN INDIVIDUALIST APPROACH TO PRIVACY DOES NOT 
WORK 
As discussed at length above, what falls within the concept of privacy 
is subject to debate, and there is really no shared definition.181  At a mini-
mum, privacy distinguishes what we choose to make part of our social self 
and what we separate therefrom.  This demarcation is contextual.182  That 
portion of our private thought, feeling and beliefs that we share—what we 
make social—with friends, neighbors, merchants, doctors, accountants, and 
lawyers, or simply the public at large in the form of a tweet or post, is likely 
very different in each instance. 
The Enlightenment taught Western societies that an individual’s pri-
vate thoughts, beliefs, and desires have value.183  This logically led to 
                                                          
179. Id. at 84. 
180. Savage, supra note 141, at 98. 
181. One reason for this may be that what we refer to as privacy in this context has little to 
do with what privacy actually means.  Considering its entomology, “[t]he word private . . . comes 
from the L[atin] privus (perhaps from prce), existing for itself, single, by itself.  In the old Latin it 
was synonymous with singulus.  Then from privus was formed the verb privo, privavi, privatum, 
privare, to set free from anything, to separate from anything or any one.”  Thus, privacy is a de-
marcation and not a thing.  JAMES MITCHELL, SIGNIFICANT ETYMOLOGY: OR ROOTS, STEMS, AND 
BRANCHES OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 214 (William Blackwood & Sons, 1908).   
182. Towards An Alternative Concept of Privacy, supra note 6, at 232 (“Helen Nissenbaum 
argues that one should go beyond the control theory and the access theory of privacy to consider 
privacy as contextual integrity.  Contextual integrity is a heuristic that analyzes changes of infor-
mation processes in specific contexts and flags departures from entrenched privacy practices as 
violations of contextual integrity.  One then analyzes if these new practices have moral superiority 
and if the privacy violation is therefore morally legitimate”).  HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN 
CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 164, 182 (Stan. U. Press 
ed. 2010).  Contextual privacy is “preserved when informational norms are respected and violated 
when informational norms are breached . . . . [W]hether or not control is appropriate depends on 
the context, the types of information, the subject, sender, and recipient.”  Id. at 140, 148. 
183. Fairfield & Engel, supra note 65, at 406 (“Most dominant theories of privacy view it 
through the lens of individualism.”). 
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conceptualizing what we deem “private” as property.  This historic under-
standing of privacy as property has biased our approach to privacy in the 
digital age, extending its reach beyond the things we possess separate from 
society.  Specifically, as “property,” what is deemed private is a commodity 
that can be freely traded by individuals with informed consent.184   
What is now clear, however, is that this approach rests on several false 
assumptions.  First, it falsely assumes that, armed with adequate information, 
individuals can make rational choices.  It is generally accepted that we can-
not.185  Second, it falsely assumes that an individual’s personal privacy de-
marcations have meaning.  They do not.  As social beings, our personal pri-
vacy demarcation is dependent upon the privacy decisions of others, most 
notably our own family, friends, and acquaintances.  Simply put, even if one 
sought maximum privacy, much of what one sought to protect could be pen-
etrated by Big Data simply based on the more lenient privacy decisions of 
those with whom that person associates.  Our current approach to protecting 
privacy is to anonymize what is collected and to require that its collection be 
subject to informed consent.  This structure, however, simply does not work. 
First, simply removing someone’s name or address from data has be-
come all but meaningless.186  “This is due to three sea changes: the number 
of datasets that can be cross-referenced has grown; the data itself has become 
richer; and, as a result, the algorithms that succeeded in creating ‘noise’ in 
datasets to prevent re-identification are no longer effective.”187  For example, 
one study demonstrates “that 87 percent of the U.S. population can be 
uniquely identified just from zip code, gender, and date of birth.”188  Re-
search also consistently shows that “[i]t is possible to use non-personal data 
                                                          
184. De Mooy, supra note 39, at 9 (“Regulatory regimes in the United States and Europe 
have taken a similar approach toward data protection since the 1970s, giving individuals the right 
to make decisions about how to manage their data.”). 
185. Jay Pil Choi et al., Privacy and Personal Data Collection with Information External-
ities, 173 J. PUB. ECON. 113, 24 (2019) (“Currently, most countries’ privacy regulation and law are 
based on ‘informed consent’ approach.  This approach finds its justification on the premise that an 
individual’s informed consent provides legitimacy for any information collection and its use.  De-
spite its intuitive appeal, there has been wide criticism against such approach.”). 
186. “Anonymity is no longer central.  As it becomes near-impossible, and maybe even 
irrelevant, we must rethink what we intend to protect when we speak of protecting privacy.”  Kam-
mourieh et al., supra note 5, at 50. 
187. Id. at 46. 
188. Fairfield & Engel, supra note 65, at 390. 
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to make predictions of a sensitive nature such as sexual orientation and fi-
nancial status.”189  Thus, while: 
U.S. federal regulations do not allow financial institutions to 
discriminate in the pricing of and access to credits based on 
personal attributes such as racial, ethnicity or other 
characteristics[, t]echnological advancements have made possible 
for lending companies to mine online and offline data and make 
offers only to populations with credit attractiveness.190 
As mentioned above, the value of Big Data commercially, socially, and po-
litically is not tying a piece of data to Alice, Bob, or Carol, but connecting 
them to a “type: a skier, a dog lover, a bank manager, [or] ‘[p]eople who 
bought this also bought [that].’”191   
 Big data exploits “homophily,” the principle that people are likely to 
interact with others who are similar to them, meaning that “from people’s 
communication networks we can identify their contacts’ likely ‘ethnicity, 
gender, income, political views and more.’”192  “‘Even if you are looking at 
purely anonymized data on the use of mobile phones, carriers could predict 
your age to within some cases plus or minus one year with over 70 percent 
accuracy.  They can predict your gender with between 70 and 80 percent 
accuracy.’”193  This is not to say we should completely dispense with the 
requirement that data be anonymized.  Instead, “[i]n the age of Big Data and 
information inferred ab extra, the traditional right to informational privacy 
[, data anonymity,]  no longer provides sufficient protection to the individual; 
it focuses solely on information collection rather than analysis, and can thus 
no longer be a fully effective instrument of control.”194  Stated more simply, 
while anonymity “may allow the individual to hide within the crowd, [it] 
                                                          
189. Kshetri, supra note 41, at 1140. 
190. Id. at 1148. 
191. Taylor et. al., supra note 8, at 10. 
192. Taylor, supra note 59, at 17. 
193. Id. at 17–18. 
194. Kammourieh et al., supra note 5, at 46. 
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cannot conceal the crowd itself.  We may be profiled in actionable ways 
without being personally identified.”195   
The addition of individualized informed consent is similarly insuffi-
cient in today’s digital landscape.  Informed consent has been the cornerstone 
of human research.196  “This approach finds its justification on the premise 
that an individual’s informed consent provides legitimacy for any infor-
mation collection and its use.”197  Extending this principal to public and pri-
vate transactions made sense when computing systems were mostly central-
ized and people “had little need to exercise their data-control rights on an on-
going basis.”198  The key premise is that individuals have some control over 
what information is collected about them and how it will be used.199  This 
transactional approach—a bargained-for exchange—fits nicely with the his-
toric notion of privacy being the personal property of an individual and, con-
sistent with a capitalist system, that privacy should be something that each 
individual can exchange with limited governmental interference.  This falls 
in line with “the general belief of economic liberalism that individual choice 
in markets will lead to the best global outcome.”200 
Most today, however, question the effectiveness of this approach.201  
Some suggest the problem is “that privacy notices are rarely read, and even 
if read, not easy to fully understand.”202  Simply educating users, however, 
yields diminishing returns.203  This is because: 
[T]he idea that consumers can make meaningful choices about 
online privacy is practically a poster child for the behavioral 
economic critique of standard microeconomics.  People aren’t 
                                                          
195. Taylor, supra note 59, at 13–14. 
196. Richterich, supra note 17, at 42. 
197. Choi et al., supra note 185, at 24. 
198. De Mooy, supra note 39, at 9. 
199. Savage, supra note 141, at 106. 
200. De Wolf et al., supra note 10, at 4. 
201. Choi et al., supra note 185, at 24. 
202. Id. at 24. 
203. Fairfield & Engel, supra note 65, at 409. 
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good at bargaining over complex, contingent, or uncertain future 
costs and benefits of the sort arising from online surveillance; no 
such bargaining occurs in fact; and it’s not clear why rights in 
information arising from interactions between an individual and 
an online entity belong to the individual (to be bargained over) 
rather than the entity (to be exploited at will).204   
“Most individuals understand neither the data stores they are helping to cre-
ate nor the ways in which data analysts can use such information to produce 
actionable insights.”205  At best, “individual-centric regulatory structure[s 
give] modern users of digital technologies . . . [the] illusion of control 
through consent notices . . . [and] ad-preference” controls.206 
There obviously exists a tradeoff between strong privacy protection and 
the economic and social benefits we as a society derive from Big Data.  
When asked, individuals usually state strong preferences for protecting pri-
vacy.  Those same individuals, however, consistently fail to act in accord-
ance with that preference, something commonly referred to as the privacy 
paradox.207  True, there are some—likely well-educated and affluent—who 
are technologically adept and can make a rational decision here.  Following 
known societal preferences, and in the absence of true altruism, these indi-
viduals will adopt more robust privacy protections for themselves, despite 
knowing that if everyone adopted the same informed approach, the economic 
and social benefit we achieve as a society from Big Data would suffer.208  
Accepting that Big Data provides a social benefit to society as a whole, these 
individuals gain all of the benefits of Big Data, while not sharing in its costs.  
Research shows that: 
                                                          
204. Savage, supra note 141, at 98. 
205. Hirsch, supra note 23, at 75. 
206. De Mooy, supra note 39, at 18. 
207. Garratt & van Oordt, supra note 161, at 3. 
208. “The result is a form of a prisoner’s dilemma situation: while each consumer has a 
private incentive to opt out of intrusive marketing, when all consumers do this, price competition 
is relaxed and consumers are harmed . . . . If our perusal of the theoretical economic literature on 
privacy has revealed one robust lesson, it is that the economic consequences of less privacy and 
more information sharing for the parties involved (the data subject and the actual or potential data 
holder) can in some cases be welfare enhancing, while, in others, welfare diminishing.”  Acquisti 
et. al., supra note 23, at 460, 462. 
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Big [D]ata is likely to affect the welfare of unsophisticated, 
vulnerable, and technologically unsavvy consumers more 
negatively.  Such consumers may lack awareness of multiple 
information sources and are less likely to receive up to date and 
accurate information about multiple suppliers in a manner that 
facilitates effective search and comparisons.  They are also not in 
a position to assess the degree of sensitiveness of their online 
actions and are more likely to be tricked by illicit actors.209   
Even more troubling, however, is the suggestion that laws regulating privacy 
will always “systematically favor the interests of sophisticated consum-
ers . . . since sophisticated consumers are on the whole more politically en-
gaged people who pay attention to legislative policy proposals and vote their 
interests.”210   
These consumers arguably think they will lose nothing from 
policies that allow firms to access their data … and are likely to 
make the necessary efforts to fight against businesses’ 
informational advantage.  Some argue that the general public 
outside this group may not necessarily be a ‘winner’ in economic 
or other terms in corporations’ [B]ig [D]ata initiatives that rely on 
‘data accessibility and manipulation.’211 
Even with respect to the sophisticated users who want to optimize personal 
privacy, it is doubtful whether one can participate in society today without 
losing some level of control over personal data, commonly referred to as the 
ever-increasing cost of maintaining privacy.212  Unless one makes judicious 
use of cryptocurrency and tor browsing,213 it is virtually impossible to en-
gage in anonymous digital transactions.  Because platforms like LinkedIn 
have become so ubiquitous in business, a candidate’s failure to have a profile 
                                                          
209. Kshetri, supra note 41, at 1152. 
210. Id. at 1143. 
211. Id. 
212. Garratt & van Oordt, supra note 161, at 26–27. 
213. A “Tor Browser” is a web browser that anonymizes the user’s web traffic using the 
Tor network. TOR (2021), www.torproject.org. 
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on the platform could be seen as a red flag.214  Moreover, communication by 
its very nature is always at least a two-way transaction.  Even if one always 
prefers the most secure, privacy protecting options, those with whom they 
communicate may not be as judicious. 
Engaging with social media is therefore not an individual choice.  
It is an inevitable outcome of being in almost any social situation.  
Location information is a particularly powerful example of how 
one person’s data can affect others.  Cell phones track individuals’ 
location precisely, and by proxy, the locations of others.215 
Today, one has essentially no choice but to pass information over a platform 
that others can observe.  Some suggest, therefore, that no reasonable expec-
tation of privacy can possibly exist anymore, but our social norms clearly 
suggest that we as a society do not agree.216 
This latter point demonstrates the implicit failing of any individualistic 
informed consent approach.  “By conceiving privacy as individual right, lib-
eral privacy conceptions fail to grasp the social existence of humans.”217  
Stated colloquially, “every middle schooler understands that a fundamental 
problem of privacy online is not what one says about oneself, but what others 
say.”218  While there may be some thoughts and actions that truly occur in 
private, most of our intimacies are shared with others.  We share our 
thoughts, feeling, and action to varying degrees with friends, loved ones, and 
professionals with some varying expectation of privacy.  That privacy, how-
ever, depends on the other sharing that same expectation.  An extreme ex-
ample of the violation of a shared expectation of privacy, which already 
prompted explicit regulation, is revenge porn. 
An individualist approach does not address the fact that “Big Data al-
lows governments and businesses to track the habits and movements of 
groups, combine and recombine people into categories, and analyze and 
                                                          
214. Barocas & Levy, supra note 42, at 583. 
215. Fairfield & Engel, supra note 65, at 402. 
216. Id. at 576.  
217. Towards An Alternative Concept of Privacy, supra note 6, at 226. 
218. Fairfield & Engel, supra note 65, at 396.  
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attempt to predict their behavior.”219  When one user consents to infor-
mation-gathering, that user becomes a conduit for gathering information 
about their entire social network, regardless of members’ consent.220  Pushed 
further, when one consents to share information, certain inferences can be 
drawn with others who share one or more traits with that person, even if the 
two have never met and are completely oblivious that they both have been 
collected into a group.221   
[D]ata is no longer gathered about one specific individual or a 
small group of people, but rather about large and undefined 
groups.  Data is analyzed on the basis of patterns and group 
profiles; the results are often used for general policies and applied 
on a large scale.  The fact that the individual is no longer central, 
but incidental to these types of processes, challenges the very 
foundations of most currently existing legal, ethical and social 
practices and theories.222   
Scholars point to this social nature of our existence as the “nail in the coffin 
of the individualistic, notice-and-consent model of privacy regulation.”223   
The current individualist, informed consent approach to privacy is 
prophylactic at best.  However, Big Tech’s concern that the more restrictive 
opt-in approaches of the GDPR and CCPA will cause economic harm is not 
necessarily without merit.  Research suggests that even a fully informed ra-
tional consumer who makes an optimal decision with respect to their privacy 
may not make the decision that is in the best interest of society on a macro-
economic scale.224 Moreover, because privacy is both contextual and rela-
tional, each individual must make innumerable discrete privacy decisions, 
                                                          
219. Kammourieh et al., supra note 5, at 50.  
220. Fairfield & Engel, supra note 65, at 410.  
221. “Big Data allows governments and businesses to track the habits and movements of 
groups, combine and recombine people into categories, and analyze and attempt to predict their 
behavior.  Individual data is no longer only useful for gaining information about and targeting the 
individual, but also – and perhaps above all – for gaining information about and targeting groups.”  
Kammourieh et al., supra note 5, at 50. 
222. Taylor et. al, supra note 8, at 13–14.  
223. Barocas & Levy, supra note 42, at 561. 
224. Id. 
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which not only impact them, but others as well.  It is simply irrational to 
conclude that each member of society in each such instance can make a fully 
informed, rational decision that is maximizing for each member of a soci-
ety.225 
Recognizing the inherent failings of the individualist approach, gov-
ernments have suggested that Big Tech simply regulate itself.  Surprisingly, 
Big Tech has been unable to formulate any rational proposal to get itself out 
of its current predicament other than to express a willingness to be regu-
lated.226  What is clear, however, is that efficiencies demand a holistic ap-
proach that maximizes privacy, economic efficiency, and the free flow of 
cultural information within a society.  There is no objectively correct demar-
cation of what society determines to be the optimal balance between privacy 
and access.  Any determination will necessarily be political.  What is clear, 
however, is that leaving this decision to us as individuals is suboptimal, as is 
regulating this demarcation on an instance-by-instance basis. 
VII. HOW TO TREAT OUR CONTRIBUTION TO OUR SOCIETY 
“How data is [characterized] affects how it is perceived, . . . which in 
turn influences [our] expectations” of how it should be treated.227  A common 
refrain is that Big Data has replaced Big Oil as the world’s most valuable 
asset.228  This comparison, along with the notion that data is discovered and 
mined, however, is not neutral.  Instead, it supports the supposition that data 
is something that can (or should) be owned by its collector.229   
Big Data shares little with oil.  While oil is finite and scarce, Data is 
not, with increasing amounts produced and collected each day.  Where oil is 
                                                          
225. “Work on relational privacy recognizes that different privacy expectations attach to 
different people and institutions in our lives, and suggests that law should take into account these 
different sensitivities in setting rules about such expectations (for example, by recognizing that we 
may have a greater interest in privacy against the government than we do against our neighbors).”  
See id. at 560. 
226. Isaac, supra note 4.  
227. Scholz, supra note 45, at 875–76. 
228. Dibley & Cole, supra note 46, at n.6; see also The World’s Most Valuable Resource 
is No Longer Oil, but Data,  ECONOMIST (May 6, 2017) https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017
/05/06/the-worlds-most-valuable-resource-is-no-longer-oil-but-data [https://perma.cc/G2SH-
ZBT5]. 
229. Scholz, supra note 45, at 876. 
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rivalrous, with many players vying for its limited supply, multiple people or 
entities can simultaneously use the same data set(s) without degradation.  
Where oil is essentially fungible, data sets are not; a data set of movie pref-
erences is not interchangeable with medical records.  Where oil is consumed 
upon use, data can be used over and over again for different purposes. 230  
Finally, oil is clearly a good, created over millions of years with limited input 
from contemporary society.231  Big Data is not.  Instead, it reflects our col-
lective preferences, statements, and actions.  Unlike oil, the value of Big Data 
is its ability to reflect who we are. 
Irrespective of the fact that the analogy of data to oil collapses under 
the slightest scrutiny, the notion of data as property is longstanding and per-
sists.232  As private property, economists have struggled to identify its rela-
tive price.   
Should the reference point be the price one would accept to give 
away their data, or the amount they would pay to protect it?  Or, 
should it be the expected cost the data subject may suffer if her 
data is exposed, or the expected profit the data holder can generate 
from acquiring her personal information?233   
What we do know, however, is that not only is privacy contextual, “[a]tti-
tudes towards privacy mainly capture subjective preferences,” meaning that 
there is no objective way to value privacy, in the way we can determine that 
a Mercedes Benz costs more than a Hyundai.234  In fact, some scholars go so 
far as to suggest that characterizing privacy as property that can be bargained 
for, “create[s] a false bargain, in which individuals could accept money in 
return for giving up on their inalienable privacy rights.”235 
Despite these analytical difficulties, it is still helpful to consider privacy 
as property in some respects.  The Nobel Prize-winning economist Elanor 
                                                          
230. Id. at 7. 
231. Id. at 10–11. 
232. “Likening data ownership to traditional property ownership is well-trodden ground.”  
De Mooy, supra note 39, at 26. 
233. Acquisti et. al, supra note 23, at 447. 
234. Id. 
235. Dibley & Cole, supra note 46, at 10. 
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Ostrom narrowed the attributes of property to two dimensions: excludability 
and rivalry.236  “Excludability refers to the extent which someone can legally 
prevent another from accessing a good; rivalry, refers to whether one per-
son’s consumption of a good impinges on another person’s consumption of 
that same good.”237  While excludability is the product of law, regulation, 
contract, or norm, rivalry refers to the product itself.  These two attributes 
form four categories of property, under which virtually all property falls.  
Private property is both rivalrous and exclusionary.  Property that is not ex-
clusive and is consumable would be a common pooled resource, like the fish 
stock in an ocean or a common grazing land, are referred to as “com-
mons.”238  Commons are relatively uncommon in the U.S. where “[m]arkets, 
private hierarchies (firms), and/or public ones (governments) are the 
norm.”239  Public goods are those that are neither rivalrous nor exclusionary, 
like the air we breathe, street lights or fire departments.240  While such prop-
erty is not subject to elimination by consumption, it can be destroyed by mis-
use (environmental contamination) or a lack of collective investment (failing 
to adequately fund a fire department).  Finally, there is property that is non-
rivalrous but exclusionary, such as a county club or a toll road.241 
As discussed above, our bias has been to view what we do, say, and 
like as individualistic private property, which resulted in our current in-
formed consent regulatory schemes.242  These schemes, however, do not 
seem to align well with the practical economic, social, or cultural realities of 
Big Data.  Instead, today, Big Data, the collection of what we do, say, and 
like, is more analogous to a country club.  A few control this “property,” but 
                                                          
236. VINCENT OSTROM & ELINOR OSTROM, ALTERNATIVES FOR DELIVERING PUBLIC 
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their collection, use, and disposition does not consume other members’ col-
lection, use, and disposition of the same. 
Much has already been written attempting to analogize our current pri-
vacy predicament—the fact that our current regulations do not adequately 
implement our social, economic, and cultural goals—to a tragedy of com-
mons.  Economic analysis shows that when property is rivalrous but not ex-
clusionary, a society will tend to over-consume beyond sustainability leading 
to collapse, such as overfishing and deforestation.243  Since Big Data is de-
fined by its vastness and velocity, the notion of such data collapsing due to 
overconsumption does not make sense.   
Others have attempted to re-conceptualize property commons rele-
vance to privacy as a trust commons.244  This reasoning suggests that as per-
sonal data is exploited, we will lose trust in the collectors.  The privacy par-
adox mentioned above along with individuals’ lack of understanding of how 
their personal data is being exploited suggests that such a social change is 
unlikely.  However, a regulatory adoption of this analogy might lead to a 
scheme that fails to adequately consider the economic and social values of 
this resource. 
Finally, what we do, say, and like has been analogized to a public good.  
While “public good” property in the economic sense is not rivalrous in that 
consumption by one does not prevent consumption by another, it does create 
tension between selfishness and cooperation.245  The free-rider dilemma, 
which is endemic to a public good—where everyone wants the benefit but 
not the burden—elegantly offers an explanation for “why everyone might 
deeply cherish privacy, yet still contribute to privacy-damaging stores of 
data, just as everyone likes clean air, but individuals still pollute.”246  The 
public good analogy from a more legal perspective is similarly helpful.  It is 
similar to the manner in which societies see investments in infrastructure, 
education, and healthcare as beneficial to the society as a whole rather than 
simply the individual receiving the public benefit at the moment.  This notion 
of public good brings an egalitarian focus to the problem of how we maxim-
ize the value of property that is neither rivalrous nor exclusionary.  The ques-
tion becomes: what should societies’ investment be here? 
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In addition to the investment a society decides to make in a particular 
public good, we must still decide how it can be utilized, balancing prefer-
ences to best match the norms of a society.  A holistic, egalitarian approach 
to our privacy dilemma seems suited to address the problems that “(1) dif-
ferent stakeholders—including businesses, consumers, and governments—
each have different, multilayered, and often conflicting objectives; [and] (2) 
information technologies, privacy concerns, and the economics of privacy 
evolve constantly, with no single study or policy intervention being able to 
fully account for future (and even some present) concerns.”247  This does not 
necessarily lead to the conclusion that more regulation is necessary, bu in-
stead, allows us to critically examine whether our current regulations actu-
ally optimize the norms we seek.  As one “school of thought holds,” our 
currently informed consent model “inhibits technology diffusion by impos-
ing costs upon the exchange of information,” while another argues that “ex-
plicit privacy protection promotes the use of information technology by re-
assuring potential adopters that their data will be safe.”248 
Regardless of whether what we do, say, and like is actually property in 
any sense, the means by which we differentiate types of property is enlight-
ening.  It also returns us to the Coarse Theorem.249  We must start from our 
present situation and realize that any change will necessarily inflict harm.  
The goal is not simply to minimize the harm, such as by outlawing cattle 
grazing because of the damage it causes a neighbor’s vegetable farm.  In-
stead, the goal is “to avoid the more serious harm.”250  “When an economist 
is comparing alternative social arrangements, the proper procedure is to com-
pare the total social product yielded by these different arrangements.”251  
What we know is that our current scheme of incident-specific regulations 
(e.g., HIPPA) and a reliance on individuals’ decisions maximizing social 
welfare (informed consent) are simply not adequate. 
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VIII. PRIVACY AS A SOCIAL NORM 
This Article is not bold enough to provide complete answers.  Instead, 
its goal is to point out the economic, social, and cultural value to what we 
do, say, and like, and to demonstrate the disconnect between our current reg-
ulatory scheme and the realities of Big Data (the repository of what we do, 
say, and like).  Today, tools exist to capture virtually every aspect of our 
lives, and based on their adoption, we view them and the data they capture 
as having normative value.  The issue remaining is whether the price we pay 
for that value is economically and socially fair.   
Another property analogy is valuable here.  Article 1, section 8 of the 
U.S. Constitution expressly empowers Congress “[t]o promote the [p]rogress 
of [s]cience and useful [a]rts, by securing for limited [t]imes to [a]uthors and 
[i]nventors the exclusive [r]ight to their respective [w]ritings and [d]iscov-
eries.”252  Virtually every other nation shares this norm: that society should 
reward those who contribute their ideas to the advancement of a nation cre-
atively or intellectually.  In this same way, those who developed the means 
to capture, store, and analyze what we say, do, and like should be rewarded 
for that effort.  The reward, however, must be normatively just.   
No country gives a citizen a perpetual monopoly over an idea they con-
tribute to society.  Instead, each nation has decided to bestow a reward com-
mensurate with the contribution, typically defined by time.  Here, by con-
trast, those who collect what we do, say, and like are given a perpetual 
monopoly over this data.  Research shows that this data gives those who 
control it a distinct economic advantage over any competitor.  While research 
shows that our contribution of what we do, say, and like has value, and fur-
ther questions whether the current bargained-for exchange is economically 
fair, there seems to be little evaluation of whether the value societies award 
to those who collect this data—an absolute monopoly—is normatively justi-
fied.  In other words, does awarding a monopoly fit our existing societal 
norms?  Would most people agree that the Amazons, Googles, and Face-
books of the world should have a monopoly?  In contrast to those who con-
tribute unique ideas (patent) or original expression (copyright) those who 
collect, store, process, and control Big Data are merely salvagers, having 
found unique ways of culling value from what otherwise would have been 
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lost.253  Considered this way, few would suggest that a salvager of what we 
do, say, and like is entitled to an award greater than an author or inventor.  
By the same token, however, a time-limited monopoly over collected data 
makes little sense due the nature and value of the good. 
In addition to questions about what we sacrifice for the collecting, stor-
ing, and processing of what we do, say, and like, there are serious questions 
about whether what we receive as a society for the private control over Big 
Data is fair.  While not a perfect analogy, a connection can be drawn between 
the value of our collective actions, statements, and preferences and the radio 
spectrum.  Historically, the analog broadcast spectrum was narrow, a limited 
resource, and we collectively decided to empower a public agency—the 
FCC—to determine how best to maximize its value consistent with our social 
norms, i.e., the public good.  Similar to our privacy, consumers, creators, and 
distributors not only had competing interests with each other, but also 
amongst themselves.  Rather than simply rely on the market or the ability of 
targeted legislation to identify and maximize social, economic, and cultural 
norms, the U.S. created the FCC to address the broadcast spectrum in a ho-
listic manner.  The FCC, however, took a hands-off approach with respect to 
the digital realm. 
Despite our preference for private property and our bias towards be-
lieving that the invisible hand of a free market will maximize our collective 
goals and desires, it simply has not worked with respect to Big Data.  Not 
only have individuals, other than the technologically adept, shown them-
selves unable to make decisions in their own best interest, nothing suggests 
they can make privacy decisions that maximize the public’s interest.  More 
troubling is the notion that our existing scheme is biased, favoring the 
wealthy, informed, and intelligent.  The privileged class derives all of Big 
Data’s benefits while shifting the burden to those less well-off.  Irrespective 
of this moral issue, individual privacy decisions have been proven as all but 
irrelevant to what data is collected about an individual.  Today, our partici-
pation in society, both socially and economically, is not only dependent upon 
our own use of tools that compromise our privacy, but the tools used by oth-
ers which also compromise our privacy irrespective of our own diligence.  
To remove these tools, or to prevent their use to mine what we do, say, and 
like, is probably no longer an option. 
Regulators have thrown up their hands and suggested that those respon-
sible for collecting, storing, and analyzing Big Data—the Amazons, 
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Googles, and Facebooks—simply regulate themselves.  These private enti-
ties in turn have pleaded for regulation but have failed to propose any alter-
native structure to replace our individualist, informed consent approach. 
What is proposed here is to replace our individualist approach with an 
egalitarian one.  Such an approach would conceive of privacy collectively 
rather than individually, acknowledge that privacy is both contextual and re-
lational, and consider the value of what we do, say, and like a public good.  
Because we, the people, create that good, we should demand that this good 
be placed under the supervision of us through a regulatory entity in the spirit 
of the FCC: a governing body established to determine how information 
about what we do, say, and like is accessed and used, guided by “the public 
interest, convenience or necessity.” 254  Like the FCC, this body would ensure 
that those with access to what we do, say, and like use that information as a 
trustee for the public that contributes to and benefits from this public good. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Precisely what such a regulatory scheme would look like, and the 
breadth and scope of its powers, is beyond the scope of this Article—though 
expanding on the ramifications of this change of focus, if valid, is plainly 
necessary.  The point here has been simply to demonstrate that what we do, 
say, and like is more akin to a collective norm than private property.  If what 
we do, say, and like is a collective norm, an individualist notice/consent 
model for regulation, however structured, will never make sense.  It is a quix-
otic attempt to fit a square peg into a round hole. 
What we do, say, and like is who we are.  It defines us socially, eco-
nomically, and culturally.  Considered this way, it is not suitable to treat this 
good as something that we each can individually bargain away to be placed 
under the exclusive control of a few private companies.  The current sys-
tem—which relies on individual choice—is neither optimal nor sustainable.  
Thus, our ability to collectively benefit from Big Data depends on our will-
ingness to conceive of data privacy collectively and—based on that under-
standing—to seek a better way of regulating it. 
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